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ABSTRACT
The importance of strategic alliances in the financial services industry is 
increasing; however, research focusing on strategic alliances is limited. In this 
dissertation, I intend to enhance the existing literature by examining the effect of strategic 
alliances on the value of financial services firms and the level of cooperation between 
partner firms involved in strategic alliances. The specific objectives of the dissertation are 
to examine the market reaction to strategic alliance announcements, to examine the pre- 
and post-announcement long-run abnormal stock performance and operating performance 
for the participants of strategic alliances, and to examine joint ventures and mergers and 
acquisitions after strategic alliances.
I examine a sample of strategic alliances made by financial services firms during 
the years 1986 to 2003 using various data sources such as the Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC) database, Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), Compustat, and 
Lexis/Nexis. The results show that the market reacts positively to the announcements of 
strategic alliances by financial services firms. The announcements of alliances increase 
the value of partner firms by 0.53%. I find no consistent evidence of abnormal stock 
performance before or after announcements. The market reaction seems to fully capture 
the wealth effects associated with strategic alliances. Alliance firms experience an 
improvement in operating performance before alliance announcements and a 
deterioration afterwards. The deterioration in operating performance after alliance
iii
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announcements is driven by the deterioration in industry performance. Strategic alliance 
firms are more likely to form joint ventures or merge than randomly selected or matched 
firms. However, joint ventures or mergers and acquisitions are not common after strategic 
alliances; only about 5% of alliances are followed with joint ventures and mergers with 
partner firms. Firms often form alliances without expecting this cooperation to become 
more involved through joint ventures or mergers. The market reacts more favorably to 
alliance announcements by firms that are subsequently acquired by the alliance partners. 
The market seems to be able to predict at the time of the alliance announcement which 
firms have potential for extending their cooperation. I also find that equity alliances and 
alliances with prior relationships between partners are more likely to be followed by joint 
ventures or mergers and acquisitions.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
To take advantage of growth opportunities, financial services firms can grow 
internally, join strategic alliances, form joint ventures, or acquire other firms. When 
compared with an acquisition or joint venture, a strategic alliance is the simplest form of 
cooperation between firms. Due to the complex and competitive financial market, 
financial services firms increasingly engage in strategic alliances for different 
motivations. For example, firms can share resources without incurring substantial risks. If 
a strategic alliance is successful and firms want to expand their cooperation, they can 
proceed with a joint venture or merger. An advantage of such a gradual increase in 
cooperation is the reduction in information asymmetry between firms before they make 
substantial investments.
The popularity of strategic alliances has attracted the attention of scholars in the 
management and finance disciplines who have examined different aspects of the issue 
both theoretically and empirically. However, little research has focused the financial 
services industry so far. This empirical study is conducted in order to investigate how 
strategic alliances can affect the value of financial services firms and the cooperation 
between partner firms after strategic alliances.
1
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2This study also has important practical implications for practitioners such as 
managers of financial services firms and shareholders of these firms. This study intends 
to provide insights into alliance activities that might help managers participate more 
effectively in alliances, from the initial formation to the final outcome. It might also help 
the shareholders of these firms to have a better idea as to the kinds of alliance activities 
that firms are engaging in and how these activities might affect their investment.
Therefore, in this dissertation, I examine the effect of strategic alliances on the 
value of financial services firms and the level of cooperation between partner firms after 
alliance formation. Chapter 1 of this study is organized as follows. Section 1.1 explains 
the importance of the use and the evolution of strategic alliances by financial services 
firms. Section 1.2 presents the purpose and specific objectives of the study. Section 1.3 
summarizes the contributions of the study. Section 1.4 presents the plan of the study.
1.1 The Importance of the Use and the Evolution of Strategic 
Alliances by Financial Services Firms
Besides internal expansion and mergers and acquisitions, strategic alliances have 
become important means for financial services firms to accelerate growth over the past 
20 years. In the 1980s, there were only a few strategic alliances involving financial 
services firms. Since 1990, however, the number of alliances has increased dramatically. 
According to the “Report on Consolidation in the Financial Sector,” about 1,640 strategic 
alliances and joint ventures involving financial services firms were formed during 1990- 
1999 in North America alone, and about half of them were formed during the 2-year 
period of 1998 through 1999 (Group of Ten, 2001). The substantial increase in the use of 
strategic alliances by financial services firms was due to the fact that financial markets
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
3became more complex and diversified. Three main factors contributed to this 
extraordinary change: deregulation in the industry (Gleason, Mathur, & Wiggins, 2003), 
technology advance, and globalization (Gup & Marino, 2003).
Deregulation in the financial services industry has gone through a long process. 
The historical reason behind regulation dated back to the stock market crash in 1929. 
Following the crash, the 1933 Banking Act (the Glass-Steagall Act) was passed to make 
banks safer. Specifically, the Act prohibited banks from offering commercial banking, 
investment banking, and insurance services altogether. The Act reduced the risk of 
speculation when these activities were conducted in one organization (Cornett, Ors, & 
Tehranian, 2002).
In 1956, the Bank Holding Company (BHC) Act was passed in order to prohibit 
banks from gaining too much power by forming bank holding companies. BHCs could 
not engage in most non-banking activities or acquire voting securities of non-banks 
(Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. Retrieved April 27,2007, from 
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/6000-100.html).
After 1963, banks started to challenge those regulations by underwriting securities 
such as commercial paper. In most cases, the courts eventually permitted these activities. 
Thus, in 1987, commercial BHCs were finally allowed to establish separate so-called 
Section 20 subsidiaries as investment banks. Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act (1933) 
forbade banks from engaging in investment services. In 1997, commercial banks were 
further able to acquire investment banks as Section 20 subsidiaries in addition to 
establishing subsidiaries on their own (Cornett, Ors, & Tehranian, 2002).
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4The deregulation process continued with the establishment of the Financial 
Services Modernization Act (the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) in 1999. This Act essentially 
ended most depression-era regulation by repealing the Glass-Steagall Act and amending 
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 by allowing for the creation of financial holding 
companies. As a result of these changes in regulation, financial holding companies were 
allowed to own banks as subsidiaries and other subsidiaries involved in various kinds of 
financial services such as investment and insurance services (Cornett, Ors, & Tehranian, 
2002).
Deregulation in the financial services industry induced competition, which 
sparked a substantial number of strategic alliances. Thus, more alliances arose within the 
financial services industry itself between different financial services providers, such as 
banks and investment services firms (Gleason, Mathur, & Wiggins, 2003)
New technologies are also dramatically changing the financial services industry. 
Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) allow customers to access their bank accounts, 
check account balances, and make withdrawals and deposits without a bank teller. 
Electronic payment systems manage payments and receipts of payments electronically. 
Online banking (or internet banking) allows customers to perform transactions and 
payments over the internet through banks’ secure websites. All these services were 
developed in order to provide more comprehensive and convenient services to the 
customers. As the competition in the industry becomes more intense, banks lacking 
technological expertise are searching for necessary partners. Thus, technological changes 
induce more cross-industry alliances between financial services firms and technology 
firms (Gup & Marino, 2003).
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5Modem communication and transportation systems and a political/legal 
environment intent on encouraging international trade and finance set the stage for 
globalization. With the extensive development of worldwide relationships between 
countries, in order to maintain competitive advantage, financial services firms can no 
longer focus only on the domestic market. With international growth, it becomes more 
and more important for financial services firms to expand their customer bases and keep 
their market shares. When financial services firms lack financial capital, human capital, 
experience, or expertise to go abroad through internal expansion or mergers and 
acquisitions, strategic alliances provide a means to overcome these problems. These 
firms gain further benefits by acquiring new knowledge, new customers, and new 
distribution systems as well as accessing hard-to-get-in markets and experiencing lower 
production costs. Thus, globalization induces more international alliances in the financial 
services industry (Gup & Marino, 2003).
With this increasingly complex and diversified financial market, international 
alliances, technology alliances, and short-term alliances targeting unique but important 
opportunities are likely to become more common (Spekman, Isabelle, & MacAvoy, 2000).
Despite the recent popularity o f strategic alliances in the financial services 
industry, limited research has been done to examine them. Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins 
(2003) and Chiou and White (2005) conducted two of the few pioneer studies. It is a 
timely opportunity for this study to enhance the existing literature by providing a more 
comprehensive and detailed investigation of the issue. It is important for this study to 
provide insight into alliance activities that might help firms to participate more
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6effectively in alliances, from the initial formation to the final outcome, as well as help 
shareholders of these firms to have a better understanding of alliance activities and how 
these activities affect their investment.
1.2 Purpose and Specific Objectives of the Study
In this dissertation, I intend to enhance the existing literature regarding strategic 
alliances. My main purpose of the study is to examine the effect of strategic alliances on 
the value of financial services firms and the level of cooperation between partner firms 
after strategic alliance formation. The specific objectives of the dissertation are as follows:
1. To examine the market reaction to strategic alliance announcements on average 
and to investigate the difference in market reactions for alliances with different 
characteristics.
2. To examine the long-run abnormal stock performance for the participants of 
strategic alliances before and after the alliance announcements and to compare it to that 
of industry peers.
3. To examine the operating performance for the participants of strategic alliances 
before and after the alliance announcements and to compare it to that of industry peers.
4. To examine the likelihood of joint ventures being formed after strategic 
alliances and to compare it to that of other randomly selected or matched firms.
5. To examine the likelihood of mergers and acquisitions after strategic alliances 
and to compare it to that of other randomly selected or matched firms.
6. To examine the market reaction to alliance announcements for alliances 
followed by joint ventures or mergers and acquisitions.
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71.3 Contributions of the Study 
The study provides two main contributions to the existing literature by examining 
the effect of strategic alliances on the value of financial services firms and the level of 
cooperation between partner firms after strategic alliances.
First, the study enhances the strategic alliance literature by providing a 
comprehensive analysis of alliances. Previous studies of strategic alliances focus on the 
market reaction to the announcement using the event-study methodology. Some of them 
further investigate the post-announcement stock performance or pre- and post­
announcement operating performance. In this study, I conduct a more comprehensive 
analysis, examining not only the market reaction to the announcement, pre- and post­
announcement stock performance of the partner firms, and pre- and post-announcement 
operating performance of the partner firms, but also the level of cooperation between 
strategic alliance partners after strategic alliance announcements. I examine the 
likelihood of joint ventures or mergers and acquisitions after strategic alliances and 
compare it to that of other randomly selected or matched firms. I further examine the 
market reaction to alliance announcements for alliances followed by joint ventures or 
mergers and acquisitions.
Second, the dissertation contributes to the study of the financial services industry 
by focusing only on strategic alliances and by extending the sample period. Due to 
deregulation in the industry, technology advancements, and globalization that make the 
financial markets more complex and diversified, there has been a substantial increase in 
strategic alliances by financial services firms in the past 20 years. However, limited 
research has been conducted to examine strategic alliances in the financial services
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
8industry. Even though quite a few studies have been conducted to investigate different 
aspects of alliance activities through the years, with a wide range of industries included in 
the samples, the results of those papers are not directly applicable to alliances in the 
financial services industry. Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins (2003) and Chiou and White 
(2005) are two of the few pioneer studies that focus on strategic alliances made by 
financial services firms. Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins (2003) examine a sample of joint 
ventures and strategic alliances of financial services firms during the period of 1985 to 
1998. Chiou and White (2005) examine a strategic alliance sample of Japanese financial 
institutions for the period of 1997-1999. Although similar to these two studies, my study 
focuses only on strategic alliances formed by U.S listed financial services firms.
Differently from Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins (2003), I exclude joint ventures 
from my strategic alliance sample. Strategic alliances are less complex than joint ventures, 
as they do not involve the creation of a new entity; thus, joint ventures have an essentially 
different ownership structure for control of assets and more defined property rights (Das, 
Sen, & Sengupta, 1998). Studies also show that strategic alliances and joint ventures tend 
to be created under different circumstances and involve different outcomes. Chan, 
Kensinger, Keown, and Martin (1997) show that strategic alliance firms tend to exhibit 
better operating performance than same-industry firms before strategic alliances, while 
Mohanram and Nanda (1996) show that firms experience performance deterioration 
before joint ventures. Chan, Kensinger, Keown, and Martin (1997) find that only 5 of 
their 345 sample alliances evolved into a joint venture or a merger between the partners. 
In contrast, Bleeke and Ernst (1995) find that 80% of joint ventures end in a takeover by 
one of the partners.
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9Furthermore, the sample period (1986-2003) of my study covers an entire 
business cycle and the deregulation process of the financial services industry, while 
Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins (2003) end their sample period in 1998, just before the 
passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) in 1999. 
As a result of the changes in regulation, financial holding companies are allowed to own 
banks as subsidiaries and other subsidiaries involved in all kinds of financial services 
such as investment services and insurance services. These regulatory changes help create 
more alliances within the financial services industry itself and thus increase the number 
of alliances formed by financial services firms as a whole.
Different from Chiou and White (2005) who investigate alliances in Japan, I 
examine alliances of U.S. listed firms and intend to provide a comparison of the alliance 
activities in the U.S. versus those in Japan.
In summary, by finishing this dissertation, I intend to make contributions to the 
existing literature of strategic alliances and the financial services industry by providing a 
longer sample period, a cleaner and more restricted sample, and a more thorough analysis.
1.4 Plan of Study
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a 
literature review of the relevant studies. It includes theoretical background on strategic 
alliances such as real option theory, resource dependence theory, signaling theory, 
transaction-cost economics theory, and business strategy theory. This chapter also 
includes relevant empirical evidence from earlier studies. Chapter 3 presents my research 
design, including hypotheses, sample description, data collection, and research 
methodology. Chapter 4 reports the empirical results of the analysis. Chapter 5 presents
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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the conclusions and implications of this study and presents recommendations for future 
research.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
As today’s financial services market becomes more and more complex, strategic 
alliances become more and more popular for firms to explore new opportunities and 
maintain their competitive advantage in the market. With alliances’ increasing 
importance, scholars in both the finance and management disciplines are exploring 
related issues and intend to provide insight into alliance activities that might help firms 
participate more effectively in the alliances, from the initial formation to the final 
outcome. Research studies might also help firms to prevent the resulting failures that are 
common for many alliances.
The management literature has provided a great deal of insight into the 
motivations for participating in strategic alliances, with strong theoretical research 
including five appealing theories: business strategy theory, real option theory, resource 
dependence theory, signaling theory, and transaction-cost economics theory. Case studies 
of individual alliances are also analyzed in order to illustrate the pros and cons of the 
alliances and the details of the allying process. Analysis of the choice between the use of 
alliances and other methods of expansion such as mergers and acquisitions is also a 
popular issue.
11
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In finance, instead of focusing on the theoretical justification for firms joining in 
alliances as much of the management literature does, the majority of research has been 
conducted in regard to quantifying the impact on the value of the firms associated with 
the alliances and further ascertaining the determinants of value creation.
The literature review of the related studies is organized as follows. I first define 
the term “strategic alliances” as used in this study in order to prevent further confusion, 
and then I provide a thorough theoretical background regarding the motivations of firms 
participating in strategic alliances that is largely based on the management literature. 
Next, I provide a detailed review of the related empirical literature regarding strategic 
alliances from studies in both the finance and management areas. In order to give an 
overall picture of alliance activities, I also give a brief description of the strategic-alliance 
formation process as well as the drawbacks that might cause the failure of strategic 
alliances. At the end of the literature review, I present a summary on how my study is 
related to the existing research.
2.1 Definition of Strategic Alliances
The definition of strategic alliances has taken various forms in the literature 
through the years. In spite of some degree of variation, several elements seem to be 
common and essential. First, an “inter-firm” strategic alliance is an activity or 
relationship with two or more firms involved (Gilroy, 1993; Parkhe, 1993; Gulati, 1998; 
Mockler, 1999). Second, in a “cooperative” strategic alliance, firms involved cannot act 
independently but must work with each other (Gilroy, 1993; Parkhe, 1993; Ireland, Hitt 
& Vaidyanath, 2002). Third, “common goal” firms get into a strategic alliance to achieve 
a certain shared aspiration, which in turn is beneficial to the individual partner firms
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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(Parkhe, 1993; Varadarajan & Cunningham, 1995; Mockler, 1999). Fourth, in a “sharing 
resources” strategic alliance, various resources such as capital, human resources, or 
technology are pooled together from the partner firms (Parkhe, 1993; Varadarajan & 
Cunningham, 1995; Gulati, 1998; Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidyanath, 2002). Fifth, a strategic 
alliance is a “hybrid” network organizational form, which is somewhere between internal 
expansion and acquisitions. (Borys & Jemison, 1989; Kensinger & Martin, 1991; 
Lorange & Roos, 1992).
In some studies, strategic alliances refer to any type of cooperative activities, 
which includes both alliances and joint ventures, while in other studies joint ventures are 
not included. This inconsistency in the literature forces me to first define the term 
“strategic alliance” for this study. A strategic alliance in this study is defined as a 
cooperative business activity with two or more organizations that share resources, 
responsibilities, risks, and rewards for achieving common goals, but no separate entity 
such as a joint venture is created.
Based on certain criteria, strategic alliances can be further classified. In the 
literature, different classifications are formed, depending on the needs of the studies. 
Some common classification schemes are listed as follows.
The first type of classification is based on the degree of equity investment and 
contractual control (Harrigan, 1985). Strategic alliances can be classified into two forms: 
non-equity alliances and equity alliances (Hitt, Ireland, & Hoskinsson, 2004). Non-equity 
alliances are less formal, pure contractual alliances without any equity investments 
between the partner firms. Partner firms are only sharing resources and achieving 
common goals but are having no contractual control. Equity alliances are alliances with
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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equity investments involved in the agreements. As the degree of equity investment 
increases, the alliances tend to be more formal and partners have more contractual control. 
Equity alliances have increased rapidly through the years. Pekar and Margulis (2003) 
document that only 25% were equity alliances in a sample of 3,000 alliances during the 
period of 1997 to 1999, while during the period of 2000 to 2002, the percentage of equity 
alliances jumped to 66% in a sample of 2,500 alliances.
Equity alliances can be further classified into two types: minority equity alliances 
and cross-equity holding alliances (Pekar & Margulis, 2003). Minority equity alliances 
are equity alliances in which minority amounts of equity investments are made in one 
partner by another partner in an alliance and the investments are less than 50% of the 
stock holdings. For example, in 1994, The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation 
(HSBC) Holdings and Banco del Sur del Peru, a unit of Luksic Group’s Invesiones 
Financieras subsidiary, formed a strategic alliance; and in the agreement, HSBC agreed to 
purchase a 10% stake in Banco del Sur del Peru. Cross-equity holding alliances are 
alliances in which partners make equity investments in each other. For example, in 2001, 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BB) and Telefonica SA (TS) formed a strategic 
alliance to provide investment services in Spain. In the agreement, TS made a 3% equity 
investment in BB, and BB increased its stock holding in TS from 8% to 10%.
The second type of classification is based on the time period of the commitment 
and level of investment. Short-term alliances of fewer than five years are transactional 
and involve less funding; long-term alliances of more than five years increase the level of 
investment; and to the extreme, in permanent alliances, the funding ranges from cross­
equity holding to wholly owned subsidiaries (Harbison & Pekar, 1998).
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The third type of classification is based on alliance activities. As alliance 
activities can involve hundreds of different of activities, such as financial services, 
marketing services, internet services, insurance services, etc, the alliances are usually 
classified into broad activity groups. One approach is illustrated in Vyas, Shelbum, and 
Rogers (1995). The study examines the degree of profitability associated with firms in 
mature industries and high-tech industries, and strategic alliances are classified into two 
forms: market-related and technology-related alliances.
The fourth type of classification is based on the geographic regions of the alliance 
partners. Domestic alliances are alliances with partner firms from one country, while 
international alliances are alliances with partner firms from different countries (Gleason, 
Mathur, & Wiggins, 2003).
The fifth type of classification is based on the industries of the partner firms. 
Within-industry/horizontal alliances are alliances with partner firms from the same 
industry, while cross-industry/diversifying alliances are alliances with partner firms from 
different industries (Gleason, Mathur, & Wiggins, 2003).
2.2 Theoretical Background—Why Financial Services Firms 
Participate in Strategic Alliances
There are five prevailing theories in the literature explaining the motivations for 
forming strategic alliances. They are business strategy theory, real options theory, 
resource dependence theory, signaling theory, and transaction-cost economics theory.
2.2.1 Business Strategy Theory
Based on the original framework of the five forces that determine the 
attractiveness of a market (Porter, 1979), Porter (1986) states the determinants of the
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
16
formation of strategic alliances: the threat from new-entry firms and substitute products, 
the bargaining power of suppliers and buyers, and the competition among firms. Strategic 
alliance firms, recognizing these forces, typically adopt one of three strategies: become 
and remain the lowest cost firm in the industry, differentiate their products from others, 
or focus on a narrow market niche in order to outperform their competitors.
Forming strategic alliances can be very useful to raise entry barriers in the 
industry and effectively reduce potential threats from future competition. Partner firms 
thus are able to maintain their competitive positions in the market (Vaidya, 1999).
Strategic alliances are often used as a strategic means for integrating or 
diversifying to expand the scale and/or scope of their operations. Firms participating in 
within-industry/horizontal alliances are seeking different geographic markets, expanding 
their product line, or eliminating competition. Firms participating in cross­
industry/diversifying alliances are seeking new expertise, new geographic or product 
markets (Gleason, Mathur, & Wiggins, 2003). Strategic alliances help firms in mature 
industries to enter into new and emerging industries. Market share can be gained by 
either entering a new geographic market or entering a new product market. When 
accessing new markets, strategic alliances represent a less costly means of acquiring 
resources without paying a high acquisition premium.
Furthermore, when firms seek global growth opportunities but lack financial 
capital, experience, or expertise necessary to undertake internal expansion, strategic 
alliances provide a means to overcome these problems. Alliances are also useful when 
certain foreign governments prohibit international mergers. Such barriers can be removed
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by entering strategic alliances with local firms from within those countries (Gleason, 
Mathur, & Wiggins, 2003).
2.2.2 Real Options Theory
An option is something offered for choice. In finance, the options are usually 
referred to as financial options, which are derivative contracts, including call options and 
put options. The holder of a financial option has the right but not the obligation to buy or 
sell a specific amount of a financial instrument on or before a specific date at a specific 
price, and the payoff is determined by the price of the financial instrument, such as a 
common stock (Kolb, 2002).
Even though businessmen have been making investment choices for centuries, 
Myers (1977) incorporates the idea of options into the business investment decision. 
Rather than dealing with financial instruments, Myers introduces the concept of a real 
option associated with tangible assets such as equipment. For example, when making an 
investment in a project, the firm has the real option of expanding, deferring, or 
abandoning the project in the future. Similar to a financial option, a real option is also the 
firm’s right but not the obligation to make a decision. Different from a financial option, a 
real option is a non-tradable contract. Only the firm itself can decide how to deal with the 
investment and cannot sell that right to others. The value of the investment can be greatly 
affected by the real option, and currently the widely used methods for valuing the real 
option are closed-form solutions, partial differential equations, and binomial lattices.
Based on the real options theory, Seth and Chi (2005) further associate the real 
option concept with strategic alliances. They argue that making strategic alliance 
decisions can be thought of as real options offered to the alliance partners. During the
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alliance process, according to the market environment and other factors, the alliance 
partners have the right but not the obligation to make decisions and take actions. If the 
prospects of the alliance seem to be good, the partner firms may continue cooperating and 
even enhance the investment. If everything seems to be unclear, the firms may halt the 
investment to conduct further investigation. If the prospects turn out to be unappealing, 
the firms may terminate the alliance and withdraw their resources. The flexibility of the 
alliance options creates value for the partner firms.
The flexibility of the alliance options further benefits the partner firms by 
allowing quick expansion and separation without divesting problems. Jensen (1993) 
argues that when a firm tries to divest its high-cost assets or excess capacity due to a 
change in the market environment, contracting problems such as negotiating contracts 
with unions, suppliers, or other stakeholders make it difficult for the firm to divest the 
resources at the optimal time. Furthermore, during the divestment process, the managers 
of integrated corporations or joint ventures are often unwilling to release the on-hand 
resources and downsize the firms, as they think that might hurt their managerial 
performance and interrupt their careers. Thus, instead of actively engaging in a divesting 
process, managers often try to hold the resources that should be divested as long as they 
can, which creates agency costs associated with divergent management-shareholder 
interests (Jensen, 1986a, b). However, when forming an alliance, the firms pool their 
resources; and when the alliance is terminated, the resources do not have to be divested 
and are still controlled by the managers of the partner firms. In this case, strategic 
alliances avoid divesting and associated agency costs.
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The flexibility associated with strategic alliances also benefits the partner firms by 
allowing firms to try out different partners when developing new technologies or new 
marketing plans. Thus, rapid-growth firms and high-technology firms that are seeking 
partners would benefit more from this flexibility of alliances (Mody, 1993).
2.2.3 Resource Dependence Theory
In today’s business world, firms often cannot secure and/or retain all the resources 
they need, and therefore must interact with others. These resources can be materials, 
human capital, financial capital, knowledge, skills, expertise, technologies, experience, 
etc. However, to a certain extent, when firms recognize that they have to depend heavily 
on other organizations for some resources, they need to minimize that dependency as 
much as possible. There are three main issues that need to be considered when this 
situation happens: what the costs to the firms would be if they keep depending on others, 
what the costs to the firms would be if  they abandon using those resources, and what the 
firms should do if conflicts arise between them and the firms that provide the dependent 
resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
In order to minimize resource dependency, firms usually adopt one of two 
strategies: buffering or bridging (Scott, 2002). Using the buffering approach, firms try to 
increase their tolerance for the loss of those external resources for a limited period of 
time. Using the bridging approach, firms try to enhance their relationships with the 
external firms that are providing the dependent resources in order to avoid their loss.
Entering strategic alliances is one of the bridging strategies. By allying with 
others, firms extend their resource bases instead of relying solely on others. The partner 
firms may also exchange and gain knowledge and ability in the process, lower their costs,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 0
and achieve economies of scale in production, and the resources pooled are used more 
efficiently (Lorange & Roos, 1992).
2.2.4 Signaling Theory
By entering strategic alliances with other participants in the market, firms provide 
signals of the quality of their resources (Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999). If firms have 
low-quality resources, maintaining strategic alliances with other firms would be costly 
(Spence, 1974). The signal benefit is especially greater for young and small firms in 
comparison to mature and large firms (Gulati & Higgins, 2003). For start-up and small 
firms, less information is available in the market; thus, keeping strategic alliances serves 
as a good signal of the quality of the firms.
2.2.5 Transaction-Cost Economics Theory
When buying a product, price is not the only cost; other costs such as 
information-collecting costs and bargaining costs are also included. Those costs besides 
price are called transaction costs.
When firms are conducting transactions to acquire assets, different organizational 
structures are chosen in order to minimize the transaction costs. The specificity level of 
the asset is an important determinant for choosing the structure (Williamson, 1975). 
When the specificity level of the asset is relatively low, the transaction can be conducted 
in an external market. When the specificity level of the asset is relatively high, the 
transaction is internalized within the organization. In between, hybrid organizational 
structures such as strategic alliances or joint ventures can be formed. Thus, firms choose 
the organizational structure with greater control of the asset when the specificity level of 
the asset increases.
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Strategic alliances may achieve optimal decision making with lower costs. In 
order to achieve optimal decision making, there are two prerequisites: the person who 
makes the decision possesses the knowledge, and the decision is associated with rewards 
and penalties. Either delegating or transferring the knowledge can be done when the 
authority does not possess the knowledge; however, both of these methods for transaction 
are costly (Jensen & Meckling, 1992). Entering a strategic alliance is less costly than 
acquiring a firm and both firms benefit from the transaction; thus, the partner firms 
possess the knowledge to make decisions, and they share the benefits and costs associated 
with the decisions they make. This is especially beneficial when high transfer costs occur 
in a transaction involving research and development.
2.2.6 Other Motivations for Forming Strategic Alliances
By entering strategic alliances, firms experience different levels of risk reduction 
and sharing. Regardless of whether firms engage in domestic or international expansions, 
entering strategic alliances helps them to reduce and share the production risks and 
financial risks (currency and exchange-rate risks) (Kvint, 1998). The risk of poor decision 
making by a single firm is reduced, as partner firms in alliances tend to have more 
objective opinions regarding the partnership; and with better decisions, the risk of failure 
for such an investment may further be reduced (Baum & Oliver, 1991). The risk of 
uncertainty associated with the changing markets is reduced when firms acquire 
knowledge and information from partners (Kogut, 1988), and possible competitive risks 
associated with new-entry firms may be reduced in the future (Balakrishnan & Koza, 
1993; Chi & McGuire, 1996).
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Forming strategic alliances between the acquirers and targets prior to mergers and 
acquisitions reduces information asymmetries through learning and solves adverse 
selection problems. Mergers and acquisitions are important means for firms to expand 
and pursue growth opportunities. However, when the information needed for the 
transaction is not distributed evenly between the participants of the transaction, an 
adverse selection problem occurs: a “bad” target is more likely to be chosen. By entering 
an alliance, the target and acquirer pool their resources first and enter the tryout phase in 
order to obtain knowledge about each other before final negotiation for transferring 
resources. Through this learning process, information is redistributed between the 
partners, and information asymmetry is reduced. The acquirer especially discovers target- 
specific information, noticing target’s strengths, weaknesses, and corporate culture (Kale, 
Singh, & Perlmutter, 2000), which helps the acquirer to decide whether the target is the 
right one to choose. Thus, forming suitable alliances serves as due diligence to solve the 
adverse selection problem for the acquisition (Arend, 2004a). When the risk of adverse 
selection is significant in a market, the reduction of information asymmetry is enhanced 
by the alliance (Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993).
2.2.7 Summary
As described above, different theories have provided different explanations for 
why financial services firms might choose to participate in strategic alliances. The 
different theories are not mutually exclusive but rather focus on different aspects of the 
motivations for forming strategic alliances. Business strategy theory suggests that 
forming alliances can help avoid entry barriers and provide market extension. Real 
options theory suggests that forming alliances can provide organizational flexibility.
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Resource dependence theory suggests that forming alliances can provide resource 
extension and reduce dependency. Signaling theory suggests that keeping alliances can 
provide a signal of the quality of the firm. Transaction-cost economics theory suggests 
that forming alliances can minimize transaction costs and achieve optimal decision 
making. Other motivations for entering strategic alliances include risk reduction and 
sharing as well as information asymmetries reduction prior to mergers and acquisitions.
2.3 Related Empirical Literature of Strategic Alliances
With the increasing importance and popularity of strategic alliances over the past 
20 years, the scholars in both the finance and the management disciplines have been 
empirically examining different aspects of strategic alliances based on the fundamental 
theories.
One big stream of studies on strategic alliances examines the market reaction to 
the alliance announcements and the impact on the value of the firms associated with the 
alliances. Most of the studies first obtain the associated values using event-study 
methodology and then determine the differences in the value created based on the 
alliance firms’ characteristics (firm size, firm age) and the type of alliance (equity, non­
equity, international, domestic) in which the firms are engaged.
Another group of studies investigates the relationships between strategic alliances 
and mergers and acquisitions. The main topics involve examining the choice between 
alliances and mergers and acquisitions by the firms and discovering the impact o f  
strategic alliances on mergers and acquisitions when the target and the acquirer were 
strategic alliance partners.
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The third group of studies focuses only on equity alliances instead of the whole 
population of strategic alliances. The most popular issue in this group of studies is to 
examine the incentives of equity investment in the strategic alliances.
There are many other topics and issues that have been studied through the years, 
such as the firm risk associated with alliances, the problem of opportunism in strategic 
alliances, and the marginal contribution of an additional alliance being added to an 
alliance portfolio.
2.3.1 Studies Regarding Strategic Alliances and Firm Values
2.3.1.1 Financial Services Industry
There are two pioneer studies that examine strategic alliances in the financial 
services industry: Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins (2003) and Chiou and White (2005).
Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins (2003) examine a sample of strategic alliances and 
joint ventures of financial services firms during the period of 1985 to 1998. The authors 
obtain the data from Securities Data Corporation (SDC) International Joint Ventures 
database. Accounting-based data are from Standard and Poor’s Research Insights, while 
stock market returns data are obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP). They identify banking, insurance, and investment services firms as follows: 
banking includes Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 6021 and 6022, insurance 
companies include SIC codes 6300s and 6400s, and investments services include SIC 
codes 6200s. They further restrict the sample to strategic alliances with at least one 
financial services firm with financial data available and remove the firms with multiple 
announcements within the 6-, 12-, or 18-month holding period. The final sample consists 
of 628 announcements with 728 participants.
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The authors conduct an event study to evaluate the market reaction to strategic 
alliance and joint venture announcements. They estimate the parameters during the 100- 
day period ending 11 days before the announcement date. The announcement period 
includes days -1 to 1 relative to the announcement day and -1 and 0 relative to the 
announcement day. A significance test based on Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991) 
is constructed.
The authors then estimate the post-announcement 6-, 12-, and 18-month average 
holding-period abnormal returns relative to the returns of industry- and size-matched 
firms. To create the matched sample, for each sample firm they first find all firms with 
the same 4-digit SIC code, and then from these firms they choose the one with the total 
assets closest to that of the sample firm to be in the matched sample. The average 
difference between the sample firm and the matched firm holding-period returns is the 
average holding-period abnormal return.
They find that the announcements of strategic alliance and joint venture firms are 
associated with 0.66% average cumulative abnormal returns. The abnormal returns are 
positive and significant for domestic, international, horizontal, and diversifying strategic 
alliances and joint ventures. Furthermore, the authors find that strategic alliance and joint 
venture firms outperform matching firms after the announcements for the holding-period 
return.
Chiou and White (2005) examine the strategic alliances sample of Japanese 
financial institutions for the period of 1997-1999. The authors identify the sample 
announcements from Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Japan Economic Times), Nikkei Interactive 
Net, and Yomiuri Shimbun. The sample is further restricted to alliances only involved
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with financial firms and with at least one publicly traded Japanese financial firm. If there 
is other news such as bond/credit-rating changes, corporate control affairs, dividends, 
earnings, financing arrangements, legal affairs, loan-loss reserves, or share repurchases 
being announced during the 3 days before and 1 day after the sample announcement, the 
observation is dropped. The final sample consists of 109 announcements with 169 
Japanese financial firms.
The authors conduct an event study to evaluate the market reaction to strategic 
alliance announcements using the market model. They estimate the market model 
parameters during the 200-day period ending 20 days before the announcement date. The 
announcement period includes days -1 and 0 relative to the announcement day. Following 
the methodology used by McConnell and Nantell (1985), the authors first form an equally 
weighted portfolio of alliance partner firms for each of the 109 alliances and then treat 
each portfolio as one security for calculating the test of significance.
The authors further use three regression models to conduct the cross-sectional 
analysis. All the dependent variables are the alliance abnormal returns. The independent 
variables include intra-group dummy (dummy=l if the alliance firms are within the same 
keiretsu, a bank-centered business group), inter-group dummy (dummy=l if the alliance 
firms are from different keiretsu), equity tie-up dummy, insurance business dummy, 
investment business dummy, asset management dummy, investment banking dummy, 
multiple-business dummy, comprehensive-business dummy, etc.
They find that, on average, announcements of strategic alliances increase the 
value of partner firms. When compared with mergers in which target firms usually gain 
substantially at the cost of the acquiring firms, the partners of the alliances are more
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concerned with a “win-win” situation, and the value gains from the alliances are spread 
more fairly among the partners. Smaller partners and inter-group alliances tend to 
experience larger percentage gains than larger partners and intra-group alliances. 
However, no significant difference is found in the abnormal returns between domestic- 
foreign and domestic-domestic alliances.
2.3.1.2 Other Industries
Several studies examine the impact on the value of the firms associated with 
alliances in a wide range of industries, including those by Chan, Kensinger, Keown, and 
Martin (1997), Das, Sen, and Sengupta (1998), and Haeussler (2004).
Chan, Kensinger, Keown, and Martin (1997) examine the value creation of 345 
non-equity strategic alliances for the partnering firms during the period of 1983 to 1992. 
The main purpose is to determine the differences in the value created based on the 
alliance firms’ characteristics and the type of alliance in which the firms are engaged.
The authors obtain the sample of firms from both the Lexis/Nexis database 
(including the Business Wire, PR Newswire, Southwest Newswire, Reuters, and United 
Press International) and the Dow Jones News Retrieval Service database (including the 
Dow Jones News Wire and the Wall Street Journal). They use “strategic” and “alliance” 
with different types of agreements, such as licensing, marketing, distribution, supply, 
production, manufacturing, development, research, and technology in searching for 
announcements and find 345 announcements of 460 partnering firms with at least one 
partner’s common stock available in the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) 
daily returns files.
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The authors first conduct an event study to evaluate the market reaction to 
strategic alliance announcements using the market model described in Dodd and Warner 
(1983). Chan et al. estimate the market model parameters during the 150-day period 
ending 21 days before the announcement date. The announcement period includes days 
-20 and +5 relative to the announcement day. Abnormal returns are averaged across firms 
for each of the 26 event days, and significance tests based on a standardized test statistic 
are constructed. Using a 2-day (-1, 0) average abnormal return does not alter the 
conclusions. They further compare the wealth changes experienced by pairs of partner 
firms in order to determine whether the wealth effect is due to value creation or wealth 
transference in an alliance between partners of different sizes.
Second, the authors use regression analysis to conduct the cross-sectional analysis. 
The dependent variable is the announcement-date abnormal return. The independent 
variables are firm size (log of market value of equity), growth opportunities variable (the 
ratio of market value to book value of assets), high- versus low-tech industry 
classification variable, and the horizontal versus non-horizontal alliances industry-focus 
variable.
Third, the authors use the procedure of Mikkelson and Partch (1994) to examine 
both the level of the firm’s operating performance and its changes during the period of 
two years before and two years after the announcement of the strategic alliance. The 
value of return on common equity, operating return on assets, and undistributed cash­
flow return on assets are compared with each firm’s median industry performance. 
Wilcoxon rank sum tests are used to determine the statistical significance.
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The authors show that the market reacts positively to strategic alliance 
announcements, especially announcements by high-tech firms, with no evidence of 
wealth transfer. Furthermore, they find that strategic alliance firms experience better 
operating performance two years before and after alliances than industry peers.
Das, Sen, and Sengupta (1998) examine the impact on the value of the firms 
associated with the strategic alliance announcements. They argue that the determinants of 
the associated value are the nature of the strategic alliance, the characteristics of the 
partners, and the relative resource dependency between the partners.
The authors use the alliance announcements from the Wall Street Journal and the 
Financial Times. They obtain the sample data of the announcements from Information 
Technology Strategic Alliances (ITSA User’s Manual, 1992) during 1987-1991. 
Furthermore, they restrict the sample by excluding joint ventures and multiparty alliances 
and by dropping alliance announcements with either an earnings or a dividend 
announcement reported five days before or after the announcement.
The authors conduct an event study to evaluate the market reaction to strategic 
alliance announcements using the market model. They estimate the market model 
parameters during the 190-day period ending 10 days before the announcement date. The 
announcement period includes days -3 to +3 relative to the announcement day. Abnormal 
returns are averaged across firms for each of the 7 event days, and significance tests 
based on a standardized test statistic are constructed.
By examining a sample of 119 strategic alliances during 1987-1991 using an 
event-study approach, the authors find that technological alliances yield greater abnormal 
returns than marketing alliances. Furthermore, firm profitability and size are negatively
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correlated with the abnormal returns. Thus, the authors conclude that the most beneficial 
partners in an alliance are smaller partners in technological alliances. On the other hand, 
marketing alliances are still able to create benefits for smaller or less profitable firms that 
form alliances with larger or more profitable partners.
Haeussler (2004) examines the market reaction to strategic alliances by German 
firms during the period of 1997-2002 and analyzes the potential determinants of the 
abnormal returns. The sample consists of 1,037 ad hoc strategic alliance announcements 
in Germany during the sample period. Stock prices of announcing firms are obtained 
from Thompson Financial Datastream.
Using the event-study approach, the author calculates abnormal returns following 
the procedure shown in Brown and Warner (1985) and Watts (1973). Multivariate 
analysis is conducted to address the determinants of the resulting abnormal returns such 
as size, age of the partner firm, and alliance characteristics.
The author concludes that the German stock market reacts positively to the 
announcements of strategic alliances and negatively to the terminations of strategic 
alliances. The market reaction is more favorable for high-technology firms, old firms, 
smaller firms, and firms not making equity investments in partner firms.
2.3.1.3 Summary
These five papers have all provided detailed performance insights into alliance 
activities using a similar event-study methodology, but samples with different 
characteristics. Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins (2003) and Chiou and White (2005) focus 
on the financial services industry, while Chan, Kensinger, Keown, and Martin (1997), 
Das, Sen, and Sengupta (1998), and Haeussler (2004) examine a wide range of industries.
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Chan, Kensinger, Keown, and Martin (1997), Das, Sen, and Sengupta (1998), and 
Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins (2003) use U.S. market data; while Haeussler (2004) uses 
data from Germany, and Chiou and White (2005) use data from Japan. Gleason, Mathur, 
and Wiggins (2003) include alliances and joint ventures in their sample; Das, Sen, and 
Sengupta (1998), Haeussler (2004), and Chiou and White (2005) include only strategic 
alliances; while Chan, Kensinger, Keown, and Martin (1997) focus on non-equity 
alliances. The time period of the samples ranges from 1983 to 2002, while the sample 
size ranges from 109 to 1,037 alliances. All of the studies except Gleason, Mathur, and 
Wiggins (2003) use multiple regression analysis with abnormal returns as the dependent 
variable to identify the determinants of the abnormal returns.
The main findings are consistent across the studies. All the event studies show 
that the announcements of strategic alliances are associated with positive average 
cumulative abnormal returns, which means that the market reacts positively to strategic 
alliance announcements, and the value of the partner firms therefore increases.
Although the main focus is on the general announcement effect of the alliances on 
the partner firms, these studies have provided additional detailed findings. The market 
reacts negatively to the terminations of strategic alliances (Haeussler, 2004). The 
abnormal returns are positive and significant for domestic, international, horizontal, and 
diversifying strategic alliances (Gleason, Mathur, & Wiggins, 2003). The market reaction 
is more favorable for smaller firms (Chiou & White, 2005; Das, Sen, & Sengupta, 1998; 
Haeussler, 2004), high-technology firms (Chan, Kensinger, Keown, & Martin, 1997; Das, 
Sen, & Sengupta, 1998; Haeussler, 2004), old firms (Haeussler, 2004), less profitable 
firms (Das, Sen, & Sengupta, 1998), and firms not making an equity investment in
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partner firms (Haeussler, 2004). Strategic alliance firms outperform matching firms after 
the announcements for the market return (Gleason, Mathur, & Wiggins, 2003) and 
strategic alliance firms experience better operating performance two years before and 
after alliances than industry peers (Chan, Kensinger, Keown, & Martin, 1997). As for 
differences between the inter- and intra-group alliances, Chiou and White (2005) find that 
inter-group alliances tend to experience larger percentage gains than intra-group alliance 
announcements.
2.3.2 Studies Regarding Strategic Alliances and Mergers and Acquisitions
Some extant literature investigates the relationships between strategic alliances 
and mergers and acquisitions, including Hagedoom and Sadowski (1999), Hagedoom and 
Duysters (2002), Porrini (2004), Jandik and Kali (2006), and Reuer and Ragozzino 
(2006).
Hagedoom and Sadowski (1999) examine a sample of 6,425 strategic technology 
alliances during the period 1970-1993 to explore the determinants of the transition from 
strategic technology alliances to mergers and acquisitions. Using the data from the 
MERIT-CATI data bank for alliances and the Securities Data dataset for mergers and 
acquisitions; the authors estimate a Poisson regression model to test their hypotheses. As 
they find only 2.6% of the strategic technology alliances in the sample leading towards 
final mergers and acquisitions, they conclude that instead of a transition strategy, the 
strategic technology alliances stand alone and provide partners with opportunities to leam 
new technologies and gain flexibility.
Hagedoom and Duysters (2002) examine a sample of 153 U.S., Canadian, and 
European Fortune 500 companies that had formed a minimum of five strategic
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technology alliances and/or merger and acquisitions during the period of 1993-1994 
using multinomial logit analysis. They find that companies that are primarily active in 
high-tech sectors prefer strategic technology alliances rather than mergers and 
acquisitions; in contrast, companies that favor mergers and acquisitions over alliances are 
mostly found in the low-tech sectors, and companies that are primarily active in medium- 
tech sectors have a mixed strategy preference over mergers and acquisitions, but not vice 
versa. Furthermore, the preference for mergers and acquisitions decreases with the size of 
the firms; in other words, smaller firms prefer alliances rather than mergers and 
acquisitions.
Porrini (2004) exams a sample of 437 acquisitions in the manufacturing sector 
completed during the period 1988-1997 and investigates whether the alliance experience 
between the target and acquirer affects acquisition performance. The author conducts 
robust regressions with change in return on assets as the dependent variable, previous 
alliance experience between the target and acquirer as the independent variable, and other 
control variables. The author concludes that the previous alliances between the targets 
and acquirers positively correlated with acquisition performance, which implies that such 
alliances provide acquirers an opportunity to acquire target-specific information which 
benefits acquisition performance.
Jandik and Kali (2006) examine a sample of international strategic alliances, 
international joint ventures, and cross-border mergers (with U.S. bidders) announced 
between 1985 and 2000. Using multivariate probit analysis and announcement abnormal 
returns analysis, they found that when legal systems improve and information asymmetry 
is reduced, arms-length arrangements such as strategic alliances and joint ventures
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replace relational arrangements. If legal/political environments continue to improve, 
eventually arms-length deals will take the place of internal firm contracting.
Reuer and Ragozzino (2006) examine a sample of mergers and acquisitions 
during the period of 1992-2002. The study investigates whether strategic alliances and 
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) could potentially lessen the risk of adverse selection in the 
acquisitions of new ventures. These researchers use binary, logistic regressions with a 
maximum likelihood estimator and 2-limit Tobit models. The authors find that inter-firm 
alliances between acquirers and targets reduce information asymmetries prior to mergers 
and acquisitions. Furthermore, prior alliances between acquirers and targets or the 
targets’ EPOs reduce the likelihood of using stock, or the amount of stock used, to finance 
acquisitions of these targets afterwards.
In summary, the main findings regarding strategic alliances and mergers and 
acquisitions are that corporate alliances are not necessarily a transition strategy leading to 
mergers and acquisitions; small firms and companies primarily in high-tech sectors prefer 
strategic technology alliances rather than mergers and acquisitions; the alliance 
experience between the target and acquirer benefits acquisition performance; strategic 
alliances replace relational arrangements and further edge out internal firm contracting 
when legal systems improve and information asymmetry is reduced; and alliances 
between acquirers and targets reduce information asymmetries prior to mergers and 
acquisitions.
2.3.3 Equity Alliances Studies
Several studies examine the incentives of equity investment in strategic alliances, 
including Pekar and Margulis (2003), Filson and Morales (2006), and Mathews (2006).
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Pekar and Margulis (2003) discuss why equity alliances are taking center stage 
and why major corporations are now choosing alliances over the “buy” or “build” options 
to stimulate growth and increase corporate wealth. The authors discuss the different 
equity alliance types and highlight characteristics, benefits, and limitations of each. They 
compare alliances with acquisitions in terms of wealth creation, revenue growth, and 
probability of success and present some real-world examples and insights from 
executives.
Filson and Morales (2006) develop a model of monitored and staged investment 
to explain why equity investment is involved in Research and Development (R&D) 
strategic alliances. They argue that the use of equity serves as a monitoring tactic that 
resolves uncertainty before committing more resources to the project. The authors use a 
large sample of 4,344 biotechnology alliances formed from the mid-1970s until May 
2001 and use a probit model in their analysis. The empirical results support their model.
Mathews (2006) develops a model for studying the incentives of using equity in 
strategic alliances. An alliance between an entrepreneurial firm and an established firm 
improves efficiency for both partners. However, the established firm tends to enter the 
partner’s market after the knowledge transfer. By assuming that, after forming an 
alliance, the firms become competitors of equal size in the entrepreneurial firm’s market 
and that the firms cannot negotiate directly on profits or entry but can only transfer equity 
while forming an alliance, the author argues that equity can eliminate the established 
firm’s entry incentive. When the established firm has a larger stake in the entrepreneurial 
firm’s monopoly profits, the established firm’s entrance into the entrepreneurial firm’s 
market becomes less attractive. When the entrepreneurial firm sells a large enough equity
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stake to an established firm, the established firm’s non-entry payoff is always larger than 
the entry payoff if  the established firm holds an equity interest in the entrepreneurial firm 
while also entering the entrepreneurial firm’s market at the same time.
In summary, the main finding in the above-mentioned studies is that equity 
investment in an alliance can serve a monitoring purpose, resolve uncertainty before 
committing more resources, and eliminate the potential entry incentive of the alliance 
partners.
2.3.4 Other Strategic Alliances Studies
Besides the above issues that are widely explored, other topics such as risk (Arend, 
2004b; Robinson, 2006), opportunism (Smith, 2005), and marginal value (Wassmer, 
2004) associated with strategic alliances are examined in the existing literature.
Chung, Singh, and Lee (2000) use a sample of underwriting syndicates for new 
common stock issues by U.S. investment banking firms during the period of 1980-1989 
to investigate the formation of strategic alliances. They conclude that the likelihood of an 
alliance being formed between investment banks is positively related to the 
complementarily of their capabilities and their similarity of status. The authors find an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between the probability of forming an alliance with a 
potential partner by the leading bank and their business relationship over the past three 
years. Investment banks seem to follow a balancing strategy that provides more 
opportunities to their past partners until they come to believe they are over-dependence 
on their old partners. Then they start exploring potential new partners in the market.
Arend (2004b) uses an event-study methodology to examine how alliance activity 
affects firm risk. The implied volatility of a firm’s stock price is used as the risk measure.
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He tests his hypotheses in the U.S.-based computing industry (i.e., SIC codes 737, 357, 
367—computer software, hardware, and components, respectively) during the period of 
1984 to 1994. The results show that volatility increases when the alliance and each firm 
have similar core activities; volatility decreases when the alliance has a governance form 
more like a joint venture or when alliance activity functions to set a technical standard. 
The author states that how managers engage in alliance activity can have a significant 
impact on the risk related to the value of shareholders.
Wassmer (2004) addresses the problem of the marginal contribution of each 
additional alliance added to an alliance portfolio using abnormal stock market returns as a 
measure. The author argues that an important determinant for value creation is the 
portfolio size. Portfolio size is defined as the number of alliances and partners in an 
alliance portfolio. Other important factors for value creation are whether the partner is a 
prior partner or a new partner and the number of alliances the focal firm has with a 
particular partner.
Smith (2005) addresses the problem of opportunism in strategic alliances. The 
author argues that the contractual board consisting of representatives from each partner 
with equal power provides an incorporated control on opportunism. The governance 
structure of alliances improves information flow and coordination of strategic-level 
decisions by forcing the alliance agreement to be implemented. Thus, an integrated check 
against opportunism by partners is one of the advantages of alliances.
Robinson (2006) investigates 70,000 international strategic alliances from 1985 to 
1999 using a self-developed model of internal capital markets and regression analysis. He 
finds that alliances typically occur between industries with different risk characteristics.
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If a firm has activities in different industries, then the alliances tend to occur in an 
industry that is riskier on average. The author also argues that the alliance activities 
cluster in risky, high-growth, high-tech industries and that certain types of contracts 
which are more easily enforced between firms than within firms result in successful 
alliances.
2.3.5 Summary
The existing empirical literature of strategic alliances provides strong evidence for 
supporting the theories that I mention in the previous section and provides more detail 
about the increase in strategic alliance activity over the past 20 years. The studies show 
that the value of the firms studied increased when they became involved with strategic 
alliances; the studies examine the impact of alliances in relation to other firm activities, 
such as mergers and acquisitions and joint ventures; and provide management of the 
firms with insights into the differences between types of alliances. Even though much 
research has been conducted, there are still important issues to be examined, and it is 
important to do so as strategic alliances are becoming more frequently employed as firms 
attempt to compete in a more complex and globalized market.
2.4 Strategic Alliance Formation Process 
In this section, I will briefly describe how a strategic alliance is formed. First of 
all, based on the market environment, the firm identifies its objectives for developing its 
business, assesses the resources needed to achieve its objectives, and discovers existing 
gaps between its actual capabilities and needed capabilities. In order to compensate for 
gaps in capabilities, the firm can either develop these capabilities itself, cooperate with 
others, or engage in mergers and acquisitions. The firm also needs to determine why
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forming a strategic alliance is a better choice than the other options (Harbison & Pekar, 
1998).
Choosing potential partners is a difficult task. Harrigan (1985) classifies the 
choice into two categories based on the firm’s motivation. In order to improve its 
competitive position in the industry, the firm looks for partners to enhance its existing 
strategic position by eliminating competitors and influencing the evolution of the industry. 
In order to achieve planned business development in a market, the firm finds partners that 
possess the potential for strengthening its current strategic position by exploring 
synergies, transferring expertise, or expanding through diversification. In order to screen 
out unsuitable partners, the firm should assess the strengths and weaknesses of each of 
the potential partners. If the potential partners have engaged in any strategic alliances 
before, a detailed check on these past experiences is a must. The past experiences of 
potential partners are references for their performance in future alliances. Even though 
the partner firms have complementary motivations when they agree to join the alliance, 
they do not have to have the same motivation. Anticipating and thinking from each 
partner’s point of view helps the firm to avoid conflicts later on.
The firm then needs to assess the value creation of the alliance and to decide what 
to offer and gain. The firm recognizes any potential difficulties, determines how the 
ownership of the alliance is divided between or among the partners, projects what the 
potential capability difference is after the alliance, and identifies what potential product 
advantage could be delivered after the alliance from the customers’ points of view 
(Harbison & Pekar, 1998).
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The firm needs to assess the impact of the alliance on stakeholders, including 
investors, workers, suppliers, customers, regulatory officials, etc, and to establish a 
system that forces the managers who are in charge of the alliance to consider the interests 
of all the stakeholders (Harbison & Pekar, 1998).
In order to negotiate effectively, the firm needs to assess its bargaining power by 
answering the following questions: What are the key capabilities and resources the firm 
brings into the alliance? Why and how does the firm need to protect its know-how? What 
are the resources the partner firms bring into the alliance and what are they seeking from 
the alliance? If the partner firms have past alliance experiences, the firm needs to study 
how the partners negotiated the alliance agreements before (Harbison & Pekar, 1998).
When negotiating the alliance, it is important to quantify the level of opportunity 
brought in or afforded by the alliance. This enhanced opportunity may help to smooth the 
obstacles during the negotiations and keep the negotiations moving forward. On the other 
hand, it also prevents wasting time on negotiations if  the opportunity is too limited 
(Harbison & Pekar, 1998).
Before implementing the alliance, a detailed plan of integration of the partner 
firms needs to be discussed. The plan should include assigning high-ability managers to 
the alliance, making clear the responsibilities and authorities of the managers, structuring 
the alliance to meet the objectives of the alliance instead of those of the individual partner 
firms, establishing a periodic review process, setting up the procedures to deal with the 
termination of the alliance, and determining the penalty and exit obligations (Harbison & 
Pekar, 1998).
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When implementing the alliance, the partner firms need to set up timetables and 
measurement tools to track the progress of the alliance and, at the same time, keep an eye 
on competitors. If problems arise during the life of the alliance, the partner firms need to 
have open communication channels in order to avoid alliance failure (Harbison & Pekar, 
1998).
In summary, the formation process of a strategic alliance starts by identifying the 
objectives and potential partners, identifying pros and cons, negotiating with potential 
partners on the agreement, and ends up with implementing the agreement. In order to 
create a successful alliance and achieve prospective objectives, some key factors need to 
be considered when forming an alliance. If the partner firms are former competitors, how 
does the alliance alter their competitive positions? If there is a cross-industry skill being 
transferred in the alliance, how do partner firms protect their know-how? After forming 
the alliance, what are the effects on stakeholders and on the value of the firms, what are 
the obligations and rights of the partner firms, what is the degree of control each firm has 
over alliance activities, and, furthermore, what are the legal liabilities? Answering such 
questions as the preceding is necessary when forming an alliance (Harbison & Pekar, 
1998).
2.5 Failures of Strategic Alliances
From either a theoretical or empirical perspective, strategic alliances can be 
beneficial for partner firms. However, when two or more firms engage and cooperate in 
one activity, it is not surprising that problems occur before accomplishing common goals 
stated in the agreement. Any kind of problem that arises during a strategic alliance might 
cause the failure of the alliance. According to an executive survey, about 30% of
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alliances were considered complete failures; 39% were clear successes (Kalmbach & 
Roussel, 1999). These results illustrate that strategic alliances break down easily during 
the alliance process. The drawbacks that might cause the failures of strategic alliances are 
summarized as follows.
The first major issue that might cause alliance failure is cultural differences. The 
number of alliances between partners from different countries is increasing (Harrigan, 
1987; Harrigan, 1988). After the formation of an alliance, everything else seems to be all 
right; however, the culture clashes make the alliance relationship difficult (Fedor & 
Werther, 1996; Vyas, Shelbum, & Rogers, 1995). Cultural differences refer not only to 
cultural issues of different countries, but also to different corporate cultures. Different 
corporate cultures between firms of the same nationality also cause failures of strategic 
alliances (Vyas, Shelbum, & Rogers, 1995).
The second major drawback in regard to alliance failure is the difference in gains. 
In alliances, partners not only share the efforts and resources, but also share the rewards. 
When the rewards are not shared equally, those firms that get less are more likely to 
withdraw from the alliances (Harrigan, 1988; Slowinski, Seelig, & Hull, 1996).
The third major drawback of strategic alliances is related to a difference in 
control. Sometimes the implementation of the strategic activities occurs outside of the 
control of one or more partner firms and makes them feel uneasy about being in the 
alliance.
Other drawbacks of strategic alliances include losing proprietary know-how, 
depending on partners for skills (Lei & Slocum, 1991), great liquidation costs of the 
alliances when partner firms separate (Day, 1995), and allying with competing firms that
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hamper the existing alliance (Singh & Mitchell, 1996).
2.6 Summary
As a result of the intensive review of past and current literature, I have gained 
knowledge of what has been done and what I may do in terms of enhancing the 
understanding of alliances. Definitions for “strategic alliances” provided in the existing 
literature help me to define “strategic alliances” for purposes of this study, which 
contains five essentials that appear in earlier studies and which lessens the confusion as to 
what an alliance is. The review of theoretical studies also provides me with a better 
understanding regarding the motivations for alliance activities. It also helps me to 
establish a framework upon which to conduct my own empirical research. The review of 
empirical studies helps me to seek research areas that I can further explore in order to 
contribute to the existing literature, such as the value of strategic alliances in the financial 
services industry, the issue of equity alliances, and the relationship between alliances and 
mergers and acquisitions. The literature review also provides reference for sample 
collection procedures and methodologies for use in this study. Furthermore, the alliance 
formation process and reasons for alliance failures help me to view the entire realm of 
alliance activities, which might induce future research on testing the choice of partners in 
the formation of alliances as well as the probabilities of failure.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In this chapter, I present my research design for this dissertation. The first part of 
this chapter presents the hypotheses for this study based on the theoretical and empirical 
literature review. The second part of this chapter provides the data sources, the procedure 
to obtain the sample, and the detailed sample descriptions. The third part of this chapter 
presents the research methodologies employed for hypotheses testing and the variables 
used in the study.
3.1 Hypotheses
According to all five theories regarding the motivations for participating in 
strategic alliances discussed in Chapter 2, strategic alliances create value for the partner 
firms. This suggests a positive overall market reaction to the strategic alliance 
announcements by financial services firms. This value creation is supported by the 
findings of existing empirical studies (Gleason, Mathur, & Wiggins, 2003; Chiou & 
White, 2005).
According to business strategy theory, strategic alliances are often used as a 
strategic means to expand the scale and/or scope of firm operations. When the partner 
firms seek new expertise, new resources, or new product markets, they may engage in
44
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cross-industry alliances. When the partner firms seek new geographic markets, expanding 
existing product lines, or raising industry barriers against potential entry by new 
competitors, they may participate in within-industry alliances. The partner firms typically 
pool complementary skills, techniques and other resources to increase their market power 
in their industry (Chan, Kensinger, Keown, & Martin, 1997). Even though strategic 
alliances can create value regardless of whether the alliances are cross-industry or within- 
industry, prior studies such as Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins (2003) show that 
integrating (within-industry) alliances or joint ventures create more value than 
diversifying (cross-industry) alliances or joint ventures by financial services firms. Thus, 
I expect that the market reaction is more favorable for financial services partner firms that 
participate in within-industry alliances than cross-industry alliances.
In order to retain competitive positions in a market experiencing rapid 
technological advance, such as the dynamic evolution in telecommunications, firms often 
seek global growth opportunities. Business strategy theory argues that when firms lack 
financial capital, experience, or expertise to go abroad through internal expansion, 
strategic alliances provide a means to overcome these problems. Alliances are also useful 
when certain foreign governments prohibit international mergers. Furthermore, besides 
corporate culture differences, country culture differences also occur in international 
alliances between partners; therefore, greater information asymmetry reduction is 
achieved between international alliance partners than between domestic alliance partners. 
In the meantime, financial risk such as currency and exchange rate risk is also reduced 
through international alliances. Thus, I expect that the market reaction is more favorable 
for financial services partner firms which participate in international alliances than
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domestic alliances and that the market reaction is more favorable for financial services 
partner firms which participate in alliances with cross-border activities than alliances 
involving within-border activities. Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins (2003) find that 
international alliances and joint ventures entered into by financial services firms create 
more value than domestic alliances.
Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels (1999) suggest that equity investment signals a greater 
level of commitment and an additional level of confidence in an alliance. The partner 
firms work more closely, participate more actively in their alliances, take more advantage 
of alliance activities, and further reduce the risk of alliance failures. Allen and Phillips 
(2000) demonstrate that abnormal returns are largest when an alliance announcement is 
combined with one partner taking an equity stake in the other. Thus, I expect that market 
reaction is more favorable for financial services partner firms that participate in equity 
alliances versus firms that participate in non-equity alliances.
When partner firms have been involved in related activities before the current 
alliance, their prior experience with each other creates a social network and provides 
important information about the reliability and capability of their partners (Gulati, 1995). 
Such prior learning establishes a better foundation for the new alliance and reduces the 
risk of alliance failure. Thus, I expect that the market reaction is more favorable for 
financial services partner firms that have prior relationships than firms that have no prior 
relationships.
As a result of deregulation in the financial services industry, financial services 
firms are now allowed to participate in all kinds of financial services activities such as 
banking services, insurance services, and investment services activities. Real options
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theory suggests that the flexibility associated with strategic alliances benefits the partner 
firms by allowing firms to try out different strategies when developing new plans. 
Business strategy theory also suggests that strategic alliances are often used as a means to 
expand the scope of operations. Thus, I expect a stronger market reaction when partner 
firms participate in financial services activities other than their own activities, in which 
they could not become involved before deregulation.
If the market reaction does not capture all the wealth effects of the alliance 
announcements and if the market underreacts or overreacts to the announcements of 
strategic alliances, I expect abnormal long-run stock performance after the alliance 
announcements. This anticipated result is supported by the findings of Gleason, Mathur, 
and Wiggins (2003). They find significant positive long-run abnormal holding period 
returns for 6-, 12-, and 18-month holding periods after the alliance and joint venture 
announcements.
When forming a strategic alliance, firms evaluate each potential alliance partner’s 
strengths and weaknesses before choosing a final alliance partner. It would be reasonable 
to expect potential alliance partners check perspective partners’ past strategic alliance 
experience in the market (Harbison & Pekar, 1998). According to signaling theory, firms 
provide signals as to the quality of their resources when participating in alliances, as 
keeping alliances with low-quality resources would be costly. Therefore, the partner firm 
chosen should outperform other firms in the same industry when meeting complementary 
motivations in an alliance. I expect that the financial services partner firms experience 
better operating performance than industry peers before strategic alliances. Chan, 
Kensinger, Keown, and Martin (1997) show that strategic alliance firms tend to exhibit
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better operating performance than same industry firms two years before strategic 
alliances.
Based on resource dependence theory, partner firms exchange and gain 
knowledge and ability through the alliance process, lower their costs, achieve economies 
of scale in production, and use the resources pooled more efficiently (Lorange & Roos, 
1992). Chan, Kensinger, Keown, and Martin (1997) find that strategic alliance firms 
experience better operating performances than industry peers two years after entering 
alliances. Thus, I expect that financial services partner firms experience improvements in 
operating performance and outperform their industry peers after entering alliances.
According to the theoretical literature, strategic alliances reduce information 
asymmetries between the partner firms. By pooling resources together, partners of 
alliances get the chance to obtain knowledge about each other before becoming more 
involved or getting into negotiations for final transfer of resources. Mody (1993) states 
that alliances represent experimental organizational forms that can evolve over time and 
give rise to joint ventures or mergers. Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) and Hurry (1993) 
also argue that collaboration such as strategic alliances open the way for a potential 
merger or lead to an acquisition of partners. Thus, I expect that financial services partner 
firms are more likely to form joint ventures or enter into mergers and acquisitions with 
partners than other firms. If the market can predict which firms have the potential to 
extend their cooperation through joint ventures or mergers and the market expects that 
such cooperation will be beneficial, the market reaction should be more favorable for 
financial services partner firms that form joint ventures or merge with partners following 
an alliance.
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3.2 Sample
In the literature, the sample sizes of the alliance studies vary widely, from only 96 
alliances (Arend, 2004b) to 1,037 alliances (Haeussler, 2004). Some studies include joint 
ventures (Gleason, Mathur, & Wiggins, 2003), while others do not (Das, Sen, & 
Sengupta, 1998). Most of the studies use U.S. data, while some investigate alliances in 
other countries such as Germany (Haeussler, 2004) and Japan (Chiou & White, 2005). 
The industries examined in these studies, again, vary from paper to paper. Most of the 
studies include a wide range of industries, while others focus on one industry, such as 
Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins (2003) and Chiou and White (2005) who examine 
alliances in the financial services industry and Arend (2004b) who examines alliances in 
the computer industry. Time periods covered by the studies start from as early as the mid- 
1970s to late 2002, with the sample period as short as two years (Hagedoom & Duysters, 
2002) to as long as 25 years (Filson & Morales, 2006).
For this study, I obtain the sample of strategic alliances of financial services firms 
from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database covering the period 1986 through 
2003. The SDC database starts providing comprehensive data on alliances in 1984; 
however, I find no strategic alliances that satisfy my sample selection criteria prior to 
1986. I examine long-run abnormal stock performance and operating performance of the 
sample firms three years after strategic alliance announcements and also examine the 
level of cooperation between partner firms after the alliances; therefore, the sample 
period ends in 2003, which leaves me three years of data to conduct those analyses. The 
18-year sample period covers an entire business cycle and the deregulation process in the
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financial services industry, which allows me to examine strategic alliances in this 
industry more thoroughly.
The initial sample includes strategic alliances with at least one firm involved in 
banking, insurance, or investment services. I use Kenneth French’s 49 industry portfolios 
to identify banking, insurance, and investment services firms: banking includes Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 6000 through 6199, insurance services firms include 
SIC codes 6300 through 6411, and investment services firms include SIC codes 6200 
through 6299 and 6700 through 6799.11 obtain SIC codes from the Center for Research 
in Security Prices (CRSP) at the beginning of the alliance announcement months. When 
SIC codes in CRSP are not available for certain firms, I obtain them from Standard and 
Poor’s Compustat. Then I restrict my sample to strategic alliances with at least one 
financial services partner firm included in CRSP at the time of the alliance announcement. 
The same restriction is imposed by Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins (2003), who also 
examine the stock market reaction to the strategic alliance and joint venture 
announcements in the financial services industry. My sample is further restricted to 
alliances that are completed and signed, while those with pending or letters of intent are 
excluded. The final sample consists of 795 strategic alliances. Only financial services 
firms in these alliances are considered as sample firms, not their non-financial partners; 
thus the final sample includes 861 financial services firms. As some of the alliances 
involve more than one financial services firm with financial data available, the number of 
firms in the sample is larger than the number of alliances.
1 This classification is available on Kenneth French’s website:
http://inba.tnck.dartinouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_49_ind_port.htm l
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In order to fulfill the purpose and objectives of this empirical study, I use different 
data sources including SDC, CRSP, Compustat, and Lexis/Nexis. From the Joint 
Ventures/Alliances section of the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database, I obtain the 
following variables describing the sample strategic alliances: the deal number of an 
alliance, the date when an alliance is announced, the 6-digit partial cusips of an alliance’s 
participants, the names of an alliance’s participants, the main activities of an alliance, the 
number of participants in an alliance, the status of an alliance (e.g., completed/signed, 
pending, letter of intent, terminated, etc.), whether the participants of an alliance are from 
different countries, whether the activities of an alliance occur in different countries, 
whether an alliance has a specified time the alliance is intended to last in the alliance 
agreement, and detailed text description of the alliance.
The announcement date of an alliance is a key variable for this study, especially 
when examining the market reaction to the alliance announcement. Therefore, after 
obtaining the announcement date of an alliance from the SDC database, I check 
Lexis/Nexis for further confirmation. Lexis/Nexis offers fixll-text online news, business, 
legal, legislative, and regulatory information. For each of the 795 alliances in the sample, 
I search business and finance news and news wires sections using the names of an 
alliance’s participants. Most of the announcement dates found in Lexis/Nexis are 
consistent with the announcement dates reported in the SDC database, while some are 
days later. For the final announcement dates in the sample, I use the dates reported in the 
SDC database, which seems to provide earlier announcement dates. Due to the sample 
size, it is not possible to ensure that there is no other news relating to sample firms right
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before or at the time of strategic alliance announcements. However, I have no reason to 
expect that such news would be biased towards positive or negative news.
From CRSP, I obtain the stock market returns for the market reaction analyses 
and the long-run abnormal stock performance analyses. From Kenneth French’s website, 
I obtain the data for the 4-factor model analysis. I use both CRSP and Compustat data for 
the operating performance analysis and for providing the financial characteristics of the 
sample firms.
From the Joint Ventures/Alliances section of the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions 
database, I obtain the following variables for examining joint ventures between partner 
firms after strategic alliances: the date when a joint venture is announced, the date when a 
joint venture is effected, the 6-digit partial cusips of a joint venture’s participants, and the 
status of a joint venture (e.g., completed/signed, pending, letter of intent, terminated, etc.). 
From the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database, I obtain the following variables for 
examining mergers and acquisitions between partner firms after strategic alliances: the 
date when a merger and acquisition is announced, the date when a merger and acquisition 
is effected, the 6-digit partial cusip of the acquirer firm, the 6-digit partial cusip of the 
target firm, and the status of a merger and acquisition (e.g., completed, withdrawn, status 
unknown, etc.).
Table 3.1 provides the number and percentage of strategic alliances by year. The 
sample covers the 1986 to 2003 period. The distribution shows a similar pattern as shown 
in the “Report on Consolidation in the Financial Sector” (Group of Ten, 2001). Only 
about 1% of sample alliances occur in the 1980s; however, since 1990, the number of 
alliances increases dramatically, with the highest number in the late 1990s. Fifty-three
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percent of sample alliances occur during the 4-year period 1997 to 2000. Deregulation in 
the financial services industry in 1997 that allowed commercial banks to acquire 
investment banks as Section 20 subsidiaries and the Financial Services Modernization 
Act passed in 1999 seem to induce strategic alliances in the industry. Sixty-six percent of 
sample alliances occur after 1996, and 40.63% occur after 1998.
Table 3.1
Distribution of strategic alliances by year.
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Num ber o f  
alliances
1 3 1 3 7 18 25 40 43 63
Percent o f  
alliances
0.13 0.38 0.13 0.38 0.88 2 .26 3.14 5.03 5.41 7.92
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total
Num ber o f  
alliances
63 91 114 128 91 52 29 23 795
Percent o f  
alliances
7 .92 11.45 14.34 16.10 11.45 6.54 3.65 2.89 100.00
The sam ple includes strategic alliances by  financial services firms announced during 1986 to 2003 reported 
in the Securities Data Corporation (SD C ) database. I lim it the sam ple to alliances involving at least one 
firm in  the financial services industry (SIC codes o f  6000  through 6199 for banking; 6300  through 6411 for 
insurance services; and 6200  through 6299 and 6700  through 6799 for investm ents services). I restrict the 
sam ple to financial services firms included in  CRSP at the tim e o f  the announcement.
Table 3.2 provides the distribution of strategic alliances by the number of alliance 
partners. The number of partners varies from 2 to 16; however, more than 89% of sample 
alliances involve only two partners, and less than 2% involve more than four partners. 
Furthermore, most sample alliances do not have time restrictions concerning the length of 
the alliance; almost 95% of alliances are open-length alliances (not reported in the table).
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Table 3.2
Distribution of strategic alliances by number of partner firms.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8  10 16 Total
709  54 17 6 3 3 1 1 1 795
89.18 6 .79  2 .14  0.75 0 .38  0.38 0 .13 0.13 0 .13 100.00
The sample includes strategic alliances b y  financial services firms announced during 1986 to 2003 reported 
in the Securities Data Corporation (SD C ) database. I lim it the sam ple to alliances involving at least one 
firm in  the financial services industry (SIC codes o f  6000  through 6199  for banking; 6300  through 6411 for 
insurance services; and 6200  through 6299  and 6700  through 6799 for investm ents services). I restrict the 
sam ple to financial services firms included in CRSP at the tim e o f  the announcement.
Table 3.3 provides the distribution of strategic alliance firms by industry. Banks 
account for about 36.82% of the sample firms, and commercial banks are the most 
common in this industry group. Insurance services firms account for about 15.68% of the 
sample firms, and life insurance firms are the most common in this industry group. 
Investment services firms account for about 47.50% of the sample firms, and holding 
offices which own the securities of banks or other firms and exercise a certain degree of 
control over those firms’ activities are the most common in this industry group. Overall, 
investment services firms participate in strategic alliances the most, banks second, and 
insurance services firms the least.
Num ber o f  
partners
Num ber o f  
alliances 
Percent o f  
alliances
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Table 3.3
Distribution of strategic alliance firms by industry.
Num ber o f Percent o f
Industry firms firms
Banks (6000  through 6199) 317 36.82
Commercial banks (6020  through 6029) 144 16.72
Foreign bank and branches (6080  through 6082) 35 4 .07
Others 138 16.03
Insurance services (6300  through 6411) 135 15.68
Life insurance (6310  through 6319) 42 4 .88
Fire, marine, and casualty insurance (6330  through 6331) 38 4.41
Others 55 6.39
Investm ent services (6200  through 6299 and 6700 through 6799) 409 47 .50
Holding offices (6710  through 6719) 190 22.07
Security brokers and dealers (6211) 93 10.80
Others 126 14.63
Total 861 100.00
The sample includes 795 strategic alliances b y  financial services firms announced during 1986 to 2003. 
These alliances involve 861 banking, insurance, or investm ent services firms. I obtain SIC codes from  
CRSP at the beginning o f  the alliance announcem ent month. W hen the SIC code in  CRSP is not available, I 
obtain it from  Compustat.
Table 3.4 provides financial characteristics of the sample firms. I obtain the 
market value of equity from CRSP at the beginning of the alliance announcement month. 
I obtain accounting variables from Compustat at the end of the fiscal year before the 
alliance announcement. I estimate the book-to-market ratio following Fama and French 
(1993) and Tobin’s q as the ratio of total assets minus the book value of common equity 
plus the market value of common equity to total assets. The sample consists of large 
financial services firms with average total assets of $104,332.30 million, ranging widely 
from $1,555.38 million in the bottom quartile to $126,933.00 million in the top quartile. 
The mean market value of equity of the sample firms is $13,438.85 million, and the mean 
book value of common equity is $6,962.05 million. The average sales for these alliance 
firms are $11,245.66 million, the mean book-to-market ratio is 0.56, and the mean
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Tobin’s q is 1.48.
Table 3.4




M edian Top quartile
Total assets, $M 104,332.30 1,555.38 31 ,471 .50 126,933.00
Market value o f  equity, $M 13,438.85 276.27 2 ,679 .30 14,034.56
B ook  value o f  com m on equity, $M 6,962.05 332.28 3,466.55 9 ,324 .00
Sales, $M 11,245.66 366.91 5,231.81 17,008.00
Book-to-m arket ratio 0.56 0.31 0.45 0.63
T obin’s q 1.48 1.04 1.10 1.37
The sample includes 795 strategic alliances b y  financial services firms announced during 1986 to 2003. 
T hese alliances involve 861 banking, insurance, and investm ent services firms. I obtain the market value o f  
equity from  CRSP at the beginning o f  the alliance announcem ent month. I obtain accounting variables from  
Compustat at the end o f  the fiscal year before the alliance announcement. I estimate the book-to-market 
ratio fo llow ing Fama and French (1993). I estimate the T obin’s q as the ratio o f  total assets m inus the book  
value o f  com m on equity plus the market value o f  com m on equity to total assets.
3.3 Methodology
In order to test the hypotheses that I present in Section 3 .1 ,1 estimate cumulative 
announcement-period abnormal returns, holding-period industry- and size-adjusted 
abnormal returns, and calendar-time abnormal returns implied by the 4-factor model.
3.3.1 Market Reaction to Strategic Alliance Announcements
In this study, I use cumulative abnormal returns during the announcement period 
to evaluate the market reaction to strategic alliance announcements. Abnormal returns are 
estimated as differences between stock returns and returns predicted by the market model. 
Stock returns o f  the alliance partner firms and returns o f  the value-weighted portfolio o f  
all CRSP firms are obtained from CRSP.
In the literature, a great deal of variation is associated with the time period for 
estimating the parameters of the market model (estimation period) and the time period for
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calculating the abnormal return of the market model (event window). The estimation 
period can be as short as 100 days (Gleason, Mathur, & Wiggins, 2003) or as long as 200 
days (Chiou & White, 2005). The event window for calculating the abnormal return also 
varies widely, from 1 day—the announcement day (Arend, 2004b), to 26 days around the 
announcement day (Chan, Kensinger, Keown, & Martin, 1997).
I estimate the market model parameters during the 150-day period ending 30 days 
before the announcement date reported in the SDC database. For the whole sample, the 
announcement periods to be examined include announcement day 0 (a 1-day event 
window), days -1 to +1 relative to the announcement day (a 3-day event window), days 
-3 to +3 relative to the announcement day (a 7-day event window), and days -5 to +5 
relative to the announcement day (an 11-day event window). These are the commonly 
used event windows in the existing literature. A longer event window would only reduce 
the power of the test (Brown & Warner, 1985). For the comparison of subsamples, I 
focus on 1-day abnormal returns since they have a similar significant value and a lower 
standard deviation than 3-day cumulative abnormal returns.
I first examine the entire sample of 861 alliance firms to test the hypothesis that 
the market reacts positively to strategic alliance announcements by financial services 
firms. In order to test other hypotheses regarding the market reaction to alliance 
announcements, I break the sample firms into different groups and examine the 
differences in the market reaction to the alliance announcements between these groups.
To classify cross-industry and within-industry alliance partner firms, I obtain the 
non-financial services partner firms for each of the alliances in the sample. In this 
classification, only the announcements with at least two firms available in CRSP are
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
included. If an alliance involves at least one firm from an industry other than the financial 
services industry, I categorize the partner firms of the alliance as cross-industry alliance 
partners. Otherwise, if an alliance involves firms only from the financial services industry, 
the partner firms are classified as within-industry alliance partners. For example, on 
March 16, 1999, three firms-Yahoo! Inc. from the computer-integrated systems-design 
industry, Bank One Corp. from the financial services industry, and First Data Corp. from 
the financial services industry—formed a strategic alliance to provide credit card 
processing services for those online stores on Yahoo’s website in the United States. As 
this alliance has one firm from other than the financial services industry, the partner firms 
are categorized as cross-industry alliance partners. On August 27, 2003, ING Group NV 
and Kookmin Bank formed a strategic alliance to engage in bancassurance activities (the 
selling of insurance products through banks) in South Korea following the new Korean 
bancassurance regulations for the selling of insurance products through banks. As this 
alliance has both firms from the financial services industry, the partner firms are 
categorized as within-industry alliance partners.
Some multiple-partner alliances have partner firms without SIC codes available in 
CRSP; I check further whether the other partner firms with SIC codes available are in the 
same industry. If they are in the same industry, I have to exclude these announcements, 
since I cannot categorize the partner firms without identifying the industries for all the 
partner firms. However, none of the announcements in the sample fit this situation. If the 
partner firms for which SIC codes are available are not in the same industry, I can 
categorize the partner firms as cross-industry alliance partners.
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I use the variable obtained from the SDC database that indicates whether the 
activities of an alliance occur in different countries in order to make a geographic 
classification. If the variable is “Y,” the partner firms of that alliance are classified as 
partners of alliances with cross-border activities. If the variable is “N,” the partner firms 
of that alliance are classified as partners of alliances with within-border activities. For 
example, on November 2, 1999, Citigroup Inc. from the United States and Nikko Beans 
Inc. from Japan formed a strategic alliance and agreed to sell each other’s products in 
their own countries. As this alliance has activities occurring in two countries—the United 
States and Japan—the partner firms are categorized as partners of alliances with cross- 
border activities. On March 4, 2003, Prudential PLC and UBS AG formed a strategic 
alliance and agreed to work together to provide life insurance services in France. As this 
alliance has activities occurring only in one country, France, the partner firms are 
categorized as partners of alliances with within-border activities.
I use the nation of the alliance participant obtained from the SDC database to 
identify whether the participants of an alliance are from different countries to provide a 
further geographic classification. If the partner firms of an alliance are from different 
countries, the firms are classified as partners in international alliances. If the partner firms 
of an alliance are from the same country, the firms are classified as partners of domestic 
alliances. For example, on January 28, 1998, Mellon Bank Corp. from the United States 
and Tokyo-Mitsubishi Asset Management, a unit of Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi from 
Japan, entered a strategic alliance and agreed to work together to offer investment 
management services. As this alliance has firms from two countries—the United States 
and Japan—the partner firms are categorized as partners in international alliances. On
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August 3, 2002, Community Bancorp of New Jersey and GMAC (General Motor 
Acceptance Corp.) Commercial Mortgage Corp. formed a strategic alliance. Under the 
alliance agreement, both firms agreed to provide financial services in the United States. 
As this alliance has both firms from one country, the United States, the partner firms are 
categorized as partners of domestic alliances.
To classify equity alliance and non-equity alliance partner firms, I obtain equity 
investment information of sample alliances from the SDC database. For each of the 
alliances in the sample, I read the detailed text information about the announcement. The 
text may provide information about which partner firm is the investor, how many shares 
of stock are purchased, what is the purchase price, or what percentage of the shares is 
purchased. If I am able to find equity investment information about at least one partner 
firm buying equity in another partner firm in an alliance, the partner firms of that alliance 
are classified as equity alliance partners. If I am not able to find any equity investment 
information, I classify the partner firms of the alliance as non-equity alliance partners. 
For example, on May 21, 1998, Fleet Financial Group and Parallel Corp. formed a 
strategic alliance to combine Fleet Financial Group’s real estate financing methods with 
Parallel Corp.’s client base. Under the alliance agreement, Fleet Financial Group acquired 
a 20% equity holding in Parallel Corp. As this alliance has one partner firm buying a 
minority equity stake (less than 50%) in another partner firm, the firms are categorized as 
equity alliance partners.
The partner firms of an alliance might have been involved in any cooperative 
relationship before the alliance announcement, which I define as a prior relationship. To 
classify the alliance firms by prior relationships, I search for evidence of relationships
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between alliance partners before the alliances in the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions 
database as well as Lexis/Nexis for three years before the alliances. If any relationship 
can be found between any two partner firms in an alliance before the alliance 
announcement, the alliance partner firms are classified as partners in strategic alliances 
with prior relationships. If no evidence of a prior relationship can be found in the SDC or 
Lexis/Nexis, the partner firms are classified as partners of strategic alliances without a 
prior relationship. For example, on November 22, 1999, PNC Bank and LendingTree, Inc. 
formed a strategic alliance. Under the alliance agreement, both firms work together to 
provide customers more loan options when customers are visiting an online-banking 
center-iVillage.com. On March 6, 1998, these two firms had already engaged in another 
relationship when PNC Bank joined LendingTree, Inc. along with three other regional 
banks—Zions Bancorp, National City Corp., and GreenPoint Financial Corp.—to establish 
LendingTree.com and provide a competitive bidding process for mortgages, auto loans, 
credit lines, and credit cards. As these two partner firms had cooperated prior to this 
alliance, they are categorized as partners in strategic alliances with a prior relationship.
Financial services sample firms participate in a total of 37 different alliance 
activities reported in the SDC. I classify the alliance activities into broad activity groups: 
financial services activities, marketing services activities, and other activities. The 
financial services activities are further broken down into banking services, financial 
services, insurance services, and investment services activities. The reason for this 
classification is that financial services activities and marketing services activities are the 
two most common types of alliance activities for financial services firms. I use the names 
of the alliance activities as reported in the SDC except for marketing services activities,
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which include both marketing services and advertising services activities. For each 
sample alliance, I use the main activity that is reported first in the database.
The next two classifications are based on the industry and activity classifications. 
First, the sample is classified into four groups regarding financial services firms 
participating in their own financial services activities in alliances: banks participating in 
banking activities, insurance services firms participating in insurance services activities, 
investment services firms participating in investment services activities, and firms 
participating in other than their industry activities. Second, the sample is classified into 
seven groups regarding financial services firms participating in financial services 
activities other than their own activities in alliances: banks participating in insurance 
services activities, banks participating in investment services activities, insurance 
services firms participating in banking activities, insurance services firms participating in 
investment activities, investment services firms participating in banking activities, 
investment services firms participating in insurance activities, and financial services 
firms participating in other than above mentioned activities.
In order to investigate the differences in the market reaction to alliance 
announcements between these groups, I use analysis of variance to test for differences in 
means and the Kurskal-Wallis test to test for differences in medians.
3.3.2 Long-run Abnormal Stock Performance
I use two methodologies to estimate long-run abnormal stock performance for the 
participants of strategic alliances: holding-period industry- and size-adjusted abnormal 
returns and calendar-time abnormal returns implied by the 4-factor model. Even though 
holding-period abnormal returns methodology is better for measuring investor experience
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related to the alliance announcements, it assumes cross-sectional independence of returns 
possibly leading to inflated ^-statistics (Fama, 1998; Mitchell & Stafford, 2000).
When an alliance firm is delisted from CRSP before the end of the returns 
estimation period, the delisting bias would affect firm returns in the analysis. In order to 
avoid this delisting bias, I add CRSP delisting return of the alliance firm as the last month 
return by following Shumway (1997) and Shumway and Warther (1999). If the CRSP 
delisting return is not available for an alliance firm and the firm is delisted because of 
performance reasons, I add -30% as the last month return for NYSE and AMEX firms 
and -55% for NASDAQ firms.
I estimate pre- and post-announcement holding-period abnormal returns of the 
alliance firms relative to the returns of industry- and size-matched firms. To create the 
matched sample, for each alliance firm I find all firms with the same 2-digit SIC code, 
and from these firms I choose the one with the market value of equity closest to that of 
the alliance firm to the matched sample. I obtain the SIC codes and market values of 
equity of alliance firms and matched firms at the beginning of the announcement month. 
Strategic alliance firms are excluded from the matched sample for the three years before 
and the three years after the announcements.
I calculate the holding-period return for each firm in the strategic alliance sample 
and the matched sample using the following formula:
HPR,a,b fld + ^ v) • 1, (1)
where HPRia b is holding-period return for the alliance or matched firm i during the 
period from a to b; Rl t is the monthly return on common shares of the alliance or matched 
firm i in month t. The difference between the strategic alliance firm and the matched firm
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holding-period returns is the holding-period abnormal return. When alliance or matched 
firm returns are unavailable for the whole post-announcement holding period, I follow 
Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck, and Rees (2002) and use firm returns for the longest period 
available. I use a cross-sectional statistic to evaluate the statistical significance of 
holding-period abnormal returns for the strategic alliance firms (Barber & Lyon, 1997).
I reexamine pre- and post-announcement abnormal returns of the alliance firms 
using the 4-factor model. I estimate 1-year (2-year, 3-year) pre-announcement calendar­
time abnormal returns for the participants of strategic alliances using the following 
procedure: Each month, I identify all firms that announced strategic alliances during the 
next year (two years, three years) and calculate average monthly returns for these firms 
(Rpt). I estimate 1-year (2-year, 3-year) post-announcement calendar-time abnormal 
returns for the participants of strategic alliances using the following procedure: Each 
month, I identify all firms that announced strategic alliances during the last year (two 
years, three years) and calculate average monthly returns for these firms (Rpt).
The remaining part of the procedure is the same for the pre- and post­
announcement returns for the participants of strategic alliances. I estimate the 4-factor 
model using three Fama and French (1993) factors and a momentum factor (Carhart, 
1997):
R pt ~ Rft ~ a  + P m (R mt -  R fi) + /3sSMB t + P hHML t + fiJJM D , + s t , (2)
where R/t is the risk-free rate for month t, (Rmt -Rft)  is the excess return on the market, 
SMBt is the difference in returns between portfolios of small and large stocks, HMLt is 
the difference in returns between high and low book-to-market stocks, and UMDt is the 
difference in returns between portfolios of high and low prior return stocks. Fama and
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French (1993) introduce the estimation procedure for the three factors. Carhart (1997) 
introduces the estimation procedure for the momentum factor. I obtain all the data on 
these factors from Kenneth French’s website.2 The intercept term a  from the 4-factor 
model determines the monthly abnormal return for the participants of strategic alliances. 
According to Mitchell and Stafford (2000), factor models are not able to explain stock 
returns in some cases, and they suggest using an adjusted a  I then follow their 
methodology and estimate the adjusted a  relative to the expected a, which I calculate as 
the average a  of 1,000 4-factor models of random samples with the same size and book- 
to-market characteristics as the strategic alliance sample. I also estimate the implied 
abnormal returns of the alliance firms for the 1-year to 3-year periods using the formula 
(1 + a/100)n-  1, where n is the number o f months in the estimation period.
2 Kenneth French’s website: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
In this chapter, I report the empirical results of the analysis. Sections 4.1, 4.2, and
4.3 present the results regarding the wealth effects of strategic alliances by financial 
services firms. Sections 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 present the results regarding the level of 
cooperation after strategic alliances by financial services firms.
Section 4.1 provides the results for market reaction to strategic alliance 
announcements. Section 4.2 presents the results for long-run abnormal stock performance 
of the sample alliance firms before and after strategic alliance announcements. Section
4.3 provides the results for operating performance of the sample alliance firms before and 
after strategic alliance announcements. Section 4.4 reports the results related to joint 
ventures after sample strategic alliances. Section 4.5 reports the results related to mergers 
and acquisitions after sample strategic alliances. Section 4.6 provides the results for 
market reaction to strategic alliance announcements for alliances followed by joint 
ventures or mergers and acquisitions. Finally, Section 4.7 summarizes all the results.
4.1 Market Reaction
Table 4.1 presents announcement-period 1-day Abnormal Returns (ARs) and 3- 
day, 7-day, and 11-day Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for strategic alliance
66
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financial services firms. Return data for event-study methodology are available for 782 
sample firms. The announcement periods include Announcement Day (AD), days -1 to 
+1 relative to the Announcement Day (AD-1 to AD+1), days -3 to +3 relative to the 
Announcement Day (AD-3 to AD+3), and days -5 to +5 relative to the Announcement 
Day (AD-5 to AD+5).
Table 4.1
Market reaction to strategic alliance announcements.
. . , M ean M edian
A nnouncem ent p en od  ,
(/-statistic) (p-value)
A D
0.40% *** 0.12% **
(2.86) (0 .015)
A D -1 to A D +1
0.53% ** 0.10% **
(2.36) (0 .040)
A D -3 to A D +3
0.08% -0.12%
(0.28) (0 .799)
A D -5  to A D +5
0.39% -0.01%
(1.18) (0 .581)
The table presents announcement-period Abnorm al Returns (A R s) for the A nnouncem ent D ay (A D ) and 
Cumulative Abnorm al Returns (C A R s) for A D -1 to A D + 1, A D -3 to A D +3, and A D -5  to A D +5 event 
w indow s for strategic alliance firms. Return data for event-study m ethodology are available for 782 sample 
firms. The A R s are estim ated using a market m odel. I estim ate market m odel parameters during the 150- 
day period ending 30  days before the announcem ent date. J-statistics are cross-sectional /-statistics. P- 
values are signed rank test p-values.
* * * ,* * , and * S ignificance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (2-tail tests).
For the whole sample, the mean announcement-day AR is 0.40% (significant at 
the 1% level), and the median is 0.12% (significant at the 5% level). Similarly, Chan, 
Kensinger, Keown, and Martin (1997) report an average of 0.64% AR at the day of the 
alliance announcement for a sample of non-equity alliance firms, while Haeussler (2004) 
finds an average of 3.8% AR for a sample of German firms. The mean 3-day CAR for my 
sample is 0.53% (significant at the 5% level), and the median is 0.10% (significant at the 
5% level). Similarly, Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins (2003) report 0.66% 3-day CARs for
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a sample o f financial services firms announcing strategic alliances or joint ventures. 
Longer announcement periods for my sample result in positive but insignificant CARs. 
The market reaction results are also consistent with Das, Sen, and Sengupta (1998) and 
Chiou and White (2005), who report positive average cumulative abnormal returns 
associated with the alliance announcements using different event windows. The findings 
support the hypothesis that the market reacts positively to strategic alliance 
announcements by financial services firms.
Table 4.2 presents the market reaction to strategic alliance announcements by 
alliance classifications. The announcement period is the announcement day reported in 
the SDC.
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Table 4.2
Market reaction to strategic alliance announcements by alliance classifications.
M ean M edian Num ber o f
(/-statistic) (p-value) observations












Investm ent services (6200  through 6299 and 6700 0.50% ** 0.07%
377













D ifference, /7-value 0.240 0.125






































D ifference, /7-value 0.706 0 .814












D ifference, //-value 0.584 0 .537
The table presents announcement-day Abnormal Returns (ARs) for strategic alliance firms by alliance classifications. 
The ARs are estimated using a market model. I estimate market model parameters during the 150-day period ending 30 
days before the announcement date. The strategic alliance announcement day is reported in the SDC. Cross-industry 
alliances involve at least one firm from other than the financial services industry. Within-industry alliances involve 
firms only from the financial services industry. Alliances with cross-border activities are alliances where activities 
occur in more than one country. Alliances with within-border activities are alliances where activities occur in one 
country. International alliances involve firms from different countries. Domestic alliances involve firms from only one 
country. Equity alliances are alliances where at least one partner firm buys equity in another partner firm. I search for 
evidence o f relationships between partners o f alliances before the alliances in the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions 
database as well as Lexis/Nexis. 7-statistics are cross-sectional /-statistics. P-values are signed rank test p-values. I use 
analysis o f variance to test for differences in means and the Kurskal-Wallis test to test for differences in medians.
***, **, and * Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (2-tail tests).
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From the industry classification, the results show that investment services firms 
experience an average announcement-day AR of 0.50% (significant at the 5% level), and 
banks experience an average AR of 0.46% (significant at the 1% level) and a median 
value of 0.26% (significant at the 1% level). AR for insurance services firms is not 
significantly different from zero. Thus, the market reacts positively when banks and 
investment services firms participate in alliances, but this is not the case for insurance 
services firms. The results are consistent with Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins (2003) who 
report positive and significant CARs for commercial banks and investment services firms 
announcing strategic alliances or joint ventures. However, they also find significant 
positive market reactions for insurance services firms.
From the cross-industry/within-industry classification, the results show that cross­
industry alliance partners experience an average announcement-day AR of 0.67% 
(significant at the 10% level) and a median value of 0.30% (significant at the 5% level); 
while within-industry alliance partners experience a mean AR not significantly different 
from zero. The results are different from the findings of Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins 
(2003) which show that integrating (within-industry) alliances or joint ventures gain more 
value than diversifying (cross-industry) alliances or joint ventures for the financial 
services partner firms.
From the cross-border/within-border activities classification, the results show that 
partners of alliances with cross-border activities experience an average announcement- 
day AR of 1.13% (significant at the 1% level) and a median value of 0.66% (significant 
at the 1% level). Partners of alliances with within-border activities experience a lower
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mean AR of 0.35% (significant at the 5% level) and a lower median value of 0.11% 
(significant at the 10% level).
From the international/domestic classification, the results show that partners of 
international alliances experience an insignificant average announcement-day AR and a 
median value of 0.12% (significant at the 10% level). Partners in domestic alliances 
experience a mean AR of 0.49% (significant at the 1% level) and a median value of 
0.11% (significant at the 10% level). The results are different from the findings of 
Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins (2003) which show that international alliances or joint 
ventures gain more value than domestic alliances or joint ventures.
From the equity investment classification, the results show that non-equity 
alliance partners experience an average announcement-day AR of 0.41% (significant at 
the 1% level) and a median value of 0.11% (significant at the 5% level); while equity 
alliance partners experience an insignificant mean AR.
From the prior relationship classification, the results show that alliance partners 
without prior relationships experience an average announcement-day AR of 0.43% 
(significant at the 1% level) and a median value of 0.11% (significant at the 5% level); 
while alliance partners with prior relationships experience an insignificant mean AR.
I also examine the difference in announcement-day ARs between cross-industry 
alliance partners and within-industry alliance partners, partners of alliances with cross- 
border activities and partners of alliances with within-border activities, partners of 
international alliances and partners of domestic alliances, equity alliance partners and 
non-equity alliance partners, as well as alliance partners with prior relationships and 
alliance partners without prior relationships. I find no significant differences in the
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market reaction to alliance announcements between these groups except for the 
difference in medians between alliances with cross-border activities and within-border 
activities. The median market reaction to announcements of alliances with cross-border 
activities is 0.66%, while it is 0.11% for alliances with within-border activities; the 
difference is significant at the 5% level. Similarly, Chiou and White (2005) find no 
significant difference in the abnormal returns between international and domestic 
alliances. The results cannot support the hypotheses that the market reaction is more 
favorable for financial services partner firms that participate in within-industry alliances 
than cross-industry alliances; firms that participate in international alliances than 
domestic alliances; firms that participate in equity alliances than non-equity alliances; 
and firms that have prior relationships than have no prior relationships. The non- 
parametric tests support the hypothesis that the market reaction is more favorable for 
financial services partner firms that participate in alliances with cross-border activities 
than alliances involving within-border activities.
I also find that cross-industry alliances, alliances involving within-border 
activities, domestic alliances, non-equity alliances, and alliances among partners without 
prior relationships are more common than other types of alliances by financial services 
firms.
Table 4.3 reports announcement-day ARs for strategic alliance firms by alliance 
activities. I use the names of the activities as reported in the SDC except for marketing 
services, which include both marketing services and advertising services. The market 
reaction is positive and significant for alliances involved in banking services, financial 
services, investment services, and marketing services. The mean AR is 0.68% for
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banking services (significant at the 10% level), 0.74% for financial services (significant 
at the 5% level), 1.75% for investment services (significant at the 5% level), 0.55% for 
marketing services (significant at the 5% level), and 0.65% for financial services as a 
whole (significant at the 1% level). The median AR is 0.30% for banking services 
(significant at the 10% level), 0.14% for financial services (significant at the 10% level), 
0.48% for investment services (significant at the 5% level), 0.33% for marketing services 
(significant at the 5% level), and 0.16% for financial services as a whole (significant at 
the 5% level). The mean and median ARs for insurance services and other services are 
statistically insignificant and have lower values. The results show that the market reaction 
is positive for the financial services partner firms that are involved in financial services 
activities such as banking services or investment services in the alliances.
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Table 4.3
Market reaction to strategic alliance announcements by alliance activities.
M ean M edian Num ber o f
(/-statistic) (p-value) observations
Financial services



































Financial services firms that participate in their ow n 1.02% *** 0.32% **
122
activities (2 .95 ) (0 .015)
Banking firms that participate in  banking 1.20% *** 0.41% ***
51
activities (2 .71) (0 .001)
Insurance services firms that participate in 0.07% -0.10%
45
insurance services activities (0 .17) (0 .863)
Investment services firms that participate in 2.29% ** 0.82%
26
investm ent services activities (2 .07) (0 .148)
Financial services firms that participate in other than 0.29% * 0.09%
660
their industry activities (1 .88) (0 .105)





participate in  their ow n activities and firms that
participate in other than their industry activities
The table presents announcem ent-day Abnormal Returns (A R s) for strategic alliance firms b y  alliance  
activities. The A R s are estim ated using a market m odel. I estim ate market m odel parameters during the 
150-day period ending 30  days before the announcement date. The strategic alliance announcement day is 
reported in  the SD C. I use the nam es o f  alliance activities as reported in the SD C  except for marketing 
services, w hich includes both marketing services and advertising services. T-statistics are cross-sectional t- 
statistics. P -values are signed rank test p -values. I use analysis o f  variance to test for differences in means 
and the Kurskal-W allis test to test for differences in  m edians.
* * * ,* * , and * Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (2-tail tests).







Num ber o f  
observations
Financial services firms that participate in banking, 
insurance, investm ent services activities other than
-0.20% -0.31%
65
their ow n activities
(-0 .67) (0 .260)
Banking firms that participate in  insurance -1.32% ** -1.08% ***
13
services activities (-2 .98) (0 .006)
Banking firms that participate in investm ent 1.09% 0.47%
15
services activities (1 .43) (0 .208)
Insurance services firms that participate in
3.61% 3.61% 1
banking activities
Insurance services firms that participate in 0.90% 0.44% s
investm ent services activities (1 .01) (0 .438)
Investm ent services firms that participate in -0.95% * -0.58% *
18
banking activities (-1 .77) (0 .074)
Investm ent services firms that participate in -0.21% 0.09%
13
insurance services activities (-0 .48) (0 .787)
Financial services firms that participate in  other than 0.46% *** 0.13% ***
717
above m entioned activities 
D ifference betw een financial services firms that
(3 .02) (0 .004)
participate in banking, insurance, investm ent services -0.66% -0.44% *
activities other than their ow n activities and firms that 
participate in  other than above m entioned activities
(1 .28) (0 .078)
The table presents announcem ent-day Abnorm al Returns (A R s) for strategic alliance firms b y  alliance  
activities. The A R s are estim ated using a market m odel. I estimate market m odel parameters during the 
150-day period ending 30  days before the announcem ent date. The strategic alliance announcem ent day is 
reported in the SDC. I use the nam es o f  alliance activities as reported in the SD C  except for marketing 
services, w hich includes both marketing services and advertising services. /-sta tistics are cross-sectional t- 
statistics. / ’-values are signed rank test p -values. I use analysis o f  variance to test for differences in  means 
and the Kurskal-W allis test to test for differences in  m edians.
***, **, and * S ignificance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (2-tail tests).
When financial services partner firms participate in their own financial activities 
in the alliances, the mean AR is 1.02% (significant at the 1% level) and the median is 
0.32% (significant at the 5% level). More specifically, when banks participate in banking 
activities, the mean AR is 1.20% (significant at the 1% level) and the median is 0.41% 
(significant at the 1% level); when investment services firms participate in investment 
activities, the mean AR is as high as 2.29%, significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, 
there is a statistically significant difference in means between the market reactions to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7 6
financial services firms when participating in their own activities and participating in any 
other activities in the alliances; the difference of 0.73% is significant at the 10% level. 
The results show that the market reaction is more favorable for financial services partner 
firms that are involved in their own financial services activities in the alliances than for 
alliance firms that participate in other than their industry activities.
When banks participate in insurance services activities in the alliances, the mean 
AR is -1.32% (significant at the 5% level) and the median is -1.08% (significant at the 
1% level). When investment services firms participate in banking activities in the 
alliances, the mean AR is -0.95% (significant at the 10% level) and the median is -0.58% 
(significant at the 10% level). Furthermore, there is a statistically significant difference in 
medians between the market reactions to financial services firms when participating in 
financial services activities other than their own activities and participating in any other 
activities in the alliances; the difference of -0.44% is significant at the 10% level. The 
results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that the market reaction is more favorable for 
financial services partner firms that are involved in financial services activities other than 
their own activities in the alliances.
In summary, the market reacts positively to the strategic alliance announcements 
by financial services firms. Banks, investment services firms, cross-industry alliance 
partners, partners of alliances with cross-border activities, partners of alliances with 
within-border activities, partners of domestic alliances, non-equity alliance partners, 
alliance partners without prior relationships, alliance partners participating in banking 
services activities, alliance partners participating in financial services activities, alliance 
partners participating in investment services activities, alliance partners participating in
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marketing services activities, alliance partners participating in their own financial 
services activities, banks participating in banking activities, and investment services firms 
participating in investment activities gain significant values for alliance announcements.
Even though different types of alliances provide different benefits and are likely 
the result of different motivations, there are no significant differences in the market 
reactions across most of them. The market reacts more favorably when firms form 
alliances with cross-border activities and participate in their own financial sector 
activities in the alliances, while the market reacts more unfavorably to partner firms 
participating in new financial services activities other than their own activities. The 
market seems to believe that the financial services firms would benefit from participating 
in alliance activities for which they have the expertise and experience. The results of this 
study provide financial services firms additional guidance for selecting from among 
various types of alliances when they elect to participate and collaborate with other firms.
4.2 Long-run Abnormal Stock Performance 
Table 4.4 presents the stock performance during the three years before strategic 
alliance announcements estimated using holding-period industry- and size-adjusted 
abnormal returns (Panel A) and calendar-time abnormal returns implied by the 4-factor 
model (Panel B). None of the holding-period abnormal returns are statistically significant. 
The abnormal returns determined by intercept a  and Adj. a  in the 4-factor model are also 
not statistically significant. Therefore, I find no evidence o f  abnormal stock performance 
before alliance announcements with either of the methodologies.
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Table 4.4
Stock performance before strategic alliance announcements.
Panel A: H olding-period abnormal returns









Panel B . Calendar-time returns
Rpt -R f t  =  a  +  Pm(Rm, -  Rft) +  PJ5MBt + PhHML, +  P JJM D , +  s,
a
(/-statistic)



























T w o years

































Panel A  reports holding-period abnormal returns o f  the alliance firms estimated relative to the returns o f  
industry- and size-m atched firms. Strategic alliance firms are excluded from  the m atched sam ple for the 
three years before to three years after the announcement. T-statistics reported in parentheses are cross- 
sectional f-statistics. Panel B  reports results from  the 4-factor m odel. To estimate 1-year (2-year, 3-year) 
period abnormal m onthly returns, each m onth I identify all firms that made strategic alliances during the 
next year (two years, three years) and calculate equally w eighted average-m onthly returns for these firms 
(Rpt). Rft is the risk-free rate, (Rmt - R ft) is the excess return on the market, SM B t is the difference in returns 
betw een portfolios o f  sm all and large stocks, HM Lt is the difference in  returns betw een h igh and low  book- 
to-market stocks, and U M D t is the difference in returns betw een portfolios o f  h igh and low  prior-retum  
stocks. The m onthly abnormal return o f  the alliance firms is determined by  the intercept term a. The 
adjusted intercept is estimated relative to the expected intercept obtained from  1,000 calendar-time 
portfolio regressions o f  random portfolios w ith  the sam e size and book-to-market characteristics as the 
strategic alliance firms. I also estimate im plied abnormal returns o f  the alliance firms for the 1- to 3-year 
periods ((1 +  a /1 0 0 )n -  1, where n  is the number o f  months in  the estim ation period).
***, **, and * S ignificance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (2-tail tests).
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Table 4.5 reports the stock performance during the three years after strategic 
alliance announcements estimated using holding-period industry- and size-adjusted 
abnormal returns (Panel A) and calendar-time abnormal returns implied by the 4-factor 
model (Panel B). During the first year after alliance announcements, alliance firms 
outperform industry- and size-matched firms by 4.10%, although the difference is only 
significant at the 10% level. This result is consistent with Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins 
(2003) who find that strategic alliance and joint venture firms outperform their industry- 
and size-matching firms after the announcements using 1-year holding-period abnormal 
returns. However, there is no evidence of holding-period abnormal returns during later 
years in my study. Furthermore, I find no evidence of abnormal stock performance using 
the 4-factor model in any of the time periods after alliance announcements. Thus, I do not 
have consistent results when using these two methodologies to support the hypothesis 
that the long-run abnormal stock performance is positive after the alliance 
announcements.
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Table 4.5
Stock performance after strategic alliance announcements.
Panel A: H olding-period abnormal returns
One year T w o years Three years
M ean 4.10% 4.36% 4.09%
(/-statistic) (1 .84)* (1 .45) (1 .25)
Panel B. Calendar-time returns
RPt -R f, = a  +  P JR m, -  RfJ + flsSMB, + ppIML, +  pJJMD, +  s,
a Adj. a  )3m J3S p h
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Panel A  reports holding-period abnormal returns o f  the alliance firms estim ated relative to the returns o f  
industry- and size-m atched firms. Strategic alliance firms are excluded from the m atched sam ple for the 
three years before to three years after the announcement. T-statistics reported in parentheses are cross- 
sectional /-statistics. Panel B  reports results from  the 4-factor m odel. To estimate 1-year (2-year, 3-year) 
period abnormal m onthly returns, each m onth I identify all firms that made strategic alliances during the 
last one year (tw o years, three years) and calculate equally w eighted  average-m onthly returns for these 
firms (Rpt). Rft is the risk-free rate, (Rmt - R ft) is the excess return on the market, SM B, is the difference in  
returns betw een  portfolios o f  sm all and large stocks, HMLt is the difference in returns betw een high and 
lo w  book-to-market stocks, and U M D , is the difference in  returns betw een portfolios o f  high and low  
prior-retum stocks. The m onthly abnormal return o f  the alliance firms is determ ined by the intercept term c l 
The adjusted intercept is estim ated relative to the expected intercept obtained from  1,000 calendar-time 
portfolio regressions o f  random portfolios w ith the sam e size and book-to-market characteristics as the 
strategic alliance firms. I also estimate im plied abnormal returns o f  the alliance firms for the 1- to 3-year 
periods ((1 +  a /1 0 0 )n-  1, where n  is the number o f  m onths in  the estim ation period).
***, **, and * S ignificance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (2-tail tests).
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4.3 Operating Performance
In order to test the hypotheses regarding the operating performance of the 
strategic alliance firms, I estimate the raw and adjusted operating performance of the 
sample alliance firms during the three years before and the three years after strategic 
alliances.
The operating performance measures used are the ratios operating income to 
assets and returns on assets of the alliance firms. I estimate the ratio of operating income 
to assets of the alliance firms as operating income before depreciation (Compustat item 
13) divided by total assets (item 6). When interest income figures (item 62) are available 
for the alliance firms, I add them to operating income before depreciation. Return on 
assets of the alliance firms is estimated as net income (item 172) divided by total assets 
(item 6). I obtain all Compustat items of the alliance firms at the end of the fiscal year.
To estimate adjusted operating performance of the alliance firms, I adjust 
performance measures using industry medians. I first define industries of the sample 
firms using 4-digit SIC codes. If fewer than ten firms are found using a 4-digit SIC code, 
I then use their 3-digit SIC code. If again fewer than ten firms are found using a 3-digit 
SIC code, I then use their 2-digit SIC code. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests evaluate the 
statistical significance of the results.
I then estimate the differences in operating performance between three years 
before and one year before alliance announcements, one year before and one year after 
alliance announcements, and one year before and three years after alliance 
announcements. The same procedure is also used for adjusted operating performance.
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Table 4.6 presents the operating performance around the alliance announcements. 
The results show that the sample firms improve operating performance before strategic 
alliance announcements. From Year -3 to Year -1, the ratio of operating income to assets 
goes up by 0.11%, significant at the 5% level, and return on assets increases by 0.05%, 
significant at the 10% level. After strategic alliance announcements, firms experience 
deterioration in operating performance. From Year -1 to Year 1, the ratio of operating 
income to assets deceases by 0.04%, significant at the 5% level, and return on assets 
decreases by 0.01%, significant at the 5% level. From Year -1 to Year 3, the ratio of 
operating income to assets deceases by 0.06%, significant at the 5% level. However, 
changes in adjusted performance measures suggest that this deterioration is driven by 
deterioration in industry performance. Around alliance announcements, alliance firms 
and same-industry firms have similar ratios of operating income to assets, while the 
returns on assets are significantly lower for alliance firms. This finding is different from 
Chan, Kensinger, Keown, and Martin (1997) who find that strategic alliance firms 
outperform their industry peers two years before through two years after alliance 
announcements without significant improvement or deterioration in operating 
performance for a sample of primarily high-tech firms. My results contradict the 
hypothesis that the financial services partner firms experience better operating 
performance than industry peers before strategic alliances. The results also contradict the 
hypothesis that the financial services partner firms experience improvement in operating 
performance and outperform their industry peers after the alliances.
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Table 4.6
Operating performance around strategic alliance announcements.
Fiscal year 
relative to the 
event year
R aw  perform ance measures, m edians Adjusted performance measures, medians
Operating 
incom e / 
assets
Return on  
assets
Operating 
incom e / 
assets
Return on  
assets
-3 3.03% 1.11% -0.09% -0.02%
-2 3.27% 1.15% -0.06% -0.03%
-1 3.43% 1.16% -0.04% -0.06% ***
0 3.28% 1.15% -0.06% -0.08% ***
1 3.01% 1.09% -0.06% -0.13% ***
2 3.08% 1.15% -0.06% -0.04% **
3 3.04% 1.18% -0.12% 0.00%
Year -3 to -1 0.11% ** 0.05% * 0.11% ** 0.00%
Year -1 to 1 -0.04% ** -0.01% ** 0.07% 0.01%
Year -1 to 3 -0.06% ** 0.04% 0.13% 0.17% ***
The table reports the raw and adjusted m edian ratios o f  operating incom e to assets and returns on assets 
before and after strategic alliances. Adjusted variables are estim ated relatively to industry m edians. To  
estimate the statistical significance o f  adjusted medians and differences in time, I use the W ilcoxon  signed- 
rank test.
***, **, and * S ignificance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (2-tail tests).
4.4 Joint Ventures after Strategic Alliances 
Mody (1993) states that alliances represent experimental organizational forms and 
that they can evolve over time and give rise to joint ventures. However, Chan, Kensinger, 
Keown, and Martin (1997) find that only five of their 345 sample alliances are followed 
by joint ventures. In order to test the hypothesis that the financial services partner firms 
are more likely to form joint ventures with partners than other firms and whether strategic 
alliances are used to prepare for joint ventures, I examine the joint ventures between 
strategic alliance partner firms after alliance announcements using both the SDC database 
and Lexis/Nexis.
As the number of participants in sample alliances ranges from 2 to 16,1 obtain the 
non-financial services partner firms for each of the sample alliances and pair the sample
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firms with their partner firms. As the number of participants of joint ventures in the Joint 
Ventures/Alliances section of the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database ranges from 2 
to 17,1 pair the joint venture participants and create a joint venture set. Then I search the 
pairs of alliance partners in the joint venture set for any joint ventures that have effective 
dates that are later than the announcement dates of the sample alliances. If effective dates 
are not available for some joint ventures in the joint venture set, the announcement dates 
are used instead for the comparison.
Besides the joint ventures found in the SDC, I search the names of those paired 
alliance firms in the sections of business and finance, mergers and acquisitions, and all 
available wire reports three years after the alliance announcements in Lexis/Nexis. I use 
pairs among the alliance firms for searching, because a joint venture might only take 
place between two firms instead of all the firms in an alliance.
After searching for joint ventures in both the SDC and Lexis/Nexis, I check for 
any repeats for the same pairs of partner firms. I keep only those joint ventures with a 
completed/signed status, and the effective dates are the earliest among the repeats.
In Table 4.7, I present the number of strategic alliance firms that expand their 
cooperation by setting up joint ventures with their alliance partners. In Panel A, I 
examine my full sample of 795 strategic alliances by financial services firms. By 
searching the SDC and Lexis/Nexis databases, I find only 14 joint ventures after the 
formation of strategic alliances (1.76% of all alliances).
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Table 4.7
Joint ventures after strategic alliances.





D ifference / ’-value
Number o f  strategic alliances 
Num ber o f  joint ventures 















Number o f  strategic alliances 
Number o f  jo in t ventures 








4 1 2 * * * 0.002
In Panel A , I exam ine the sam ple o f  795 strategic alliances by  financial services firms announced during 
1986 to 2 0 0 3 .1 search the Joint V entures/A lliances section  o f  the SD C  M ergers and A cquisitions database 
and L exis/N exis to find w hich strategic alliance firms form ed join t ventures w ith alliance partners after the 
alliance. For comparison, I create a random sam ple by  replacing each firm in  the strategic alliance sam ple 
by a random ly selected  CRSP firm included in the database at the time o f  the alliance. In Panel B , I 
exam ine the sam ple restricted to strategic alliances w ith at least tw o firms included in  CRSP at the tim e o f  
the alliance. For comparison, I create a sample matched by  the 2-digit SIC code and the market value o f  
equity at the beginning o f  the alliance announcem ent month. To test the differences in percentages o f  jo in t 
ventures betw een  the sam ples, I calculate z-statistics and report the corresponding p-values.
***, **, and * S ignificance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (2-tail tests).
Forming a joint venture is a common event these days in the competitive market 
environment. There were about 60,446 joint ventures formed during the 1990s around the 
globe (Moskalev & Swensen, 2007). To eliminate the possibility that joint ventures are as 
likely among strategic alliance firms as among any other firms, I create a random sample 
of firms and search the SDC database for joint ventures among these firms. I use a 
random sample instead of a matching sample because the majority of the full sample 
firms are not included in CRSP or Compustat and I cannot obtain firm characteristics to 
use for matching. The random sample is created by replacing each firm in a strategic 
alliance by a randomly selected CRSP firm included in the database at the time of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8 6
alliance announcement. I require that the same random firm not be included in the same 
strategic alliance more than once. The random sample excludes strategic alliance firms in 
my sample. I find no evidence of joint ventures for the random sample firms after 
strategic alliance dates. To test the statistical significance of difference in the percentages 
of joint ventures for alliance and randomly selected firms, I calculate the z-statistic and 
report the corresponding p-value. The test shows that the strategic alliance firms are more 
likely to create joint ventures than randomly selected firms, significant at the 1% level.
In Panel B of Table 4 .7 ,1 examine the sample restricted to 267 strategic alliances 
with at least two firms included in CRSP at the time of the alliance announcement. 
Twelve of these strategic alliances (4.49%) are followed by joint ventures. For 
comparison, I create a sample matched by the 2-digit SIC code and the market value of 
equity at the beginning of the alliance announcement month, then search the SDC 
database for joint ventures among these matched firms. I find one joint venture created by 
the matched firms after strategic alliance dates. To test the statistical significance of 
difference in the percentages of joint ventures for alliance and matched firms, I calculate 
the z-statistic and report the corresponding p-value. The test shows that the strategic 
alliance firms are more likely to create joint ventures than matched firms, significant at 
the 1% level.
In summary, the results support the hypothesis that strategic alliance firms are 
more likely to form joint ventures with partners than randomly selected or matched firms. 
However, joint ventures are not common after strategic alliances; only about 1.76% of 
alliances in my sample result in joint ventures. Similarly, Chan, Kensinger, Keown, and 
Martin (1997) find only 1.45% of their 345 sample alliances evolve into joint ventures.
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This finding suggests that firms often form alliances without expecting this cooperation 
to become more involved through joint ventures. Therefore, instead of a preparation 
strategy for forming joint ventures later on, a strategic alliance seems to stand alone as an 
organizational strategy itself and provides alliance partners with other motivations.
4.5 Mergers and Acquisitions after Strategic Alliances 
Mergers and acquisitions are an important means for firms to expand or explore 
growth opportunities. However, because of the information asymmetry between the target 
and the acquirer, the bidding price may be incorrect or the targets with bad quality may 
be selected. Strategic alliances between the target and the acquirer before the acquisition 
can help to reduce this information asymmetry. By pooling resources together and doing 
the tryout, the partners of the alliance get the chance to obtain knowledge about each 
other before getting into negotiations for the final transfer of resources. It is a trial 
marriage and is an important first step before eventually undertaking a merger or 
acquisition (Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993). Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) and Hurry 
(1993) also argue that collaboration such as forming a strategic alliance opens the way for 
a potential merger or leads to an acquisition of partners. To test the hypothesis that the 
financial services partner firms are more likely to undertake mergers and acquisitions 
with partners than other firms and determine whether strategic alliances are used to 
prepare for mergers and acquisitions, I examine mergers and acquisitions between the 
strategic alliance partner firms following alliance announcements using both the SDC 
database and Lexis/Nexis.
As the number of participants in sample alliances ranges from 2 to 16, I first 
obtain the non-financial services partner firms for each of the sample alliances and pair
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the sample firms with their partner firms. Then I search these pairs in the SDC Mergers 
and Acquisitions section for any deals that have effective dates that are later than the 
announcement dates of the sample alliances. If effective dates are not available for some 
deals in the SDC, I use the announcement dates instead for the comparison.
Besides the mergers and acquisitions found in the SDC, I search the names of 
those paired alliance firms in the sections of business and finance, mergers and 
acquisitions, and all available wire reports three years after the alliance announcements in 
Lexis/Nexis. I use pairs among the alliance firms for searching, because mergers and 
acquisitions might only take place between two firms instead of all the firms in an 
alliance.
After searching for mergers and acquisitions in both the SDC and Lexis/Nexis, I 
check for any repeats for the same pairs of partner firms. I keep only those mergers with 
status as completed, and the effective days are the earliest among the repeats.
In Table 4.8, I present the number of strategic alliance firms that expand their 
cooperation by merging with their alliance partners. In Panel A, I examine my full sample 
of 795 strategic alliances by financial services firms. By searching the SDC and 
Lexis/Nexis, I find only 23 mergers and acquisitions after the formation of strategic 
alliances (2.89% of all alliances).3
3 Initially I found 28 announcements o f  mergers and acquisitions b y  strategic alliance firms; how ever, two  
o f  them were withdrawn, another tw o were pending, and one was in  unknown status.
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Table 4.8
Mergers and acquisitions after strategic alliances.






Num ber o f  strategic alliances 
Number o f  mergers and acquisitions 















Number o f  strategic alliances 
Num ber o f  mergers and acquisitions 









In Panel A , I exam ine the sam ple o f  795 strategic alliances b y  financial services firms announced during 
1986 to 2 0 0 3 .1 search the SD C  M ergers and A cquisitions database and L exis/N exis to find w hich  strategic 
alliance firms m erged w ith alliance partners after the alliance. For comparison, I create a random sam ple by  
replacing each firm in the strategic alliance sam ple b y  a randomly selected CRSP firm included in  the 
database at the tim e o f  the alliance. In Panel B , I exam ine the sam ple restricted to strategic alliances w ith at 
least tw o firms included in  CRSP at the tim e o f  the alliance. For comparison, I create a sam ple m atched by  
the 2-digit SIC code and the market value o f  equity at the beginning o f  the alliance announcem ent month. 
To test the differences in  percentages o f  mergers and acquisitions betw een the sam ples, I calculate z- 
statistics and report the corresponding p-values.
* * * ,* * , and * S ignificance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (2-tail tests).
Mergers and acquisitions are frequent events. The “Report on Consolidation in the 
Financial Sector” shows that 7,634 mergers and acquisitions occurred in the financial 
services industry during the 1990s around the world (Group of Ten, 2001). To eliminate 
the possibility that mergers are as likely among strategic alliance firms as among any 
other firms, I again create a random sample of firms and search the SDC database for 
mergers and acquisitions among these firms. I find no evidence of mergers and 
acquisitions for the random sample firms after strategic alliance dates. To test the 
statistical significance of difference in the percentages of mergers for alliance and 
randomly selected firms, I calculate the z-statistic and report the corresponding p-value.
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The test shows that the strategic alliance firms are more likely to merge than randomly 
selected firms, significant at the 1% level.
In Panel B of Table 4 .8 ,1 examine the sample restricted to 267 strategic alliances 
with at least two firms included in CRSP at the time of the alliance announcement. Six of 
these strategic alliances (2.25%) are followed by mergers and acquisitions. For 
comparison, I again create a sample matched by the 2-digit SIC code and the market 
value of equity at the beginning of the alliance announcement month, then search the 
SDC database for mergers among these matched firms. I find no evidence of mergers 
and acquisitions for matched firms after strategic alliance dates. To test the statistical 
significance of difference in the percentages of mergers for alliance and matched firms, I 
calculate the z-statistic and report the corresponding p-value. The test shows that the 
strategic alliance firms are more likely to merge than matched firms, significant at the 5% 
level.
In summary, the results support the hypothesis that strategic alliance firms are 
more likely to merge with partners than randomly selected or matched firms. However, 
mergers and acquisitions are not common after strategic alliances; only about 2.89% of 
alliances in my sample are followed by mergers and acquisitions. Similarly, Hagedoom 
and Sadowski (1999) also find only 2.6% of the strategic technology alliances in their 
sample leading towards final mergers and acquisitions. This finding suggests that firms 
often form alliances without expecting this cooperation to become more involved through 
mergers. Thus, instead of a transition strategy for entering mergers and acquisitions, 
strategic alliances seem to stand alone as an organizational strategy itself and are a 
reflection of partners’ ulterior motives.
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4.6 Market Reaction to Alliance Announcements for Alliances 
followed by Joint Ventures or Mergers and Acquisitions
Table 4.9 presents the announcement-day ARs for strategic alliance firms that 
extend their cooperation after strategic alliance announcements. The ARs are estimated 
using a market model. I estimate market model parameters during the 150-day period 
ending 30 days before the announcement date. Joint ventures or mergers and acquisitions 
after the alliances are found from the earlier analysis. If the market can predict which 
firms will extend their cooperation and the market expects that such cooperation will be 
beneficial, there should be a more favorable market reaction to the alliance 
announcements for alliances followed by joint ventures or mergers and acquisitions. I use 
analysis of variance to test for differences in means and the Kurskal-Wallis test to test for 
differences in medians.
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Table 4.9
Market reaction to strategic alliance announcements for alliances followed by joint 
ventures or mergers and acquisitions.
M ean M edian Num ber o f
(/-statistic) (p-value) observations
Partners o f  strategic alliances fo llow ed  by jo in t 
ventures betw een partners
Other strategic alliance partners









(1 .94) (0 .326)
-0.18% -0.27%
(-0 .64) (0 .588)
4.43% ** 2.24% *
(2.38) (0 .064)
-4.61% ** -2.51% *
(-2 .79) (0 .055)






Partners o f  strategic alliances fo llow ed  b y  mergers and 
acquisitions betw een partners
Acquiring firms 
Target firms
D ifference betw een acquiring firms and 
target firms
Other strategic alliance partners
D ifference betw een  alliances fo llow ed  b y  mergers and 





The table presents announcem ent-day Abnormal Returns (A R s) for strategic alliance firms. The A R s are 
estimated using a market m odel. I estimate market m odel parameters during the 150-day period ending 30  
days before the announcem ent date. The strategic alliance announcement day is reported in  the SDC. I 
search the SD C  M ergers and A cquisitions database and L exis/N exis to find w hich strategic alliance firms 
form ed join t ventures or m erged w ith alliance partners after the alliance. T-statistics are cross-sectional t- 
statistics. P -values are signed rank test p -values. I use analysis o f  variance to test for differences in means 
and the Kurskal-W allis test to test for differences in  m edians.
***, **, and * Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (2-tail tests).
I find no significant differences in the market reactions for firms participating in 
alliances followed by joint ventures. It seems that the market is not able to predict joint 
ventures or does not believe them to be beneficial to the firms. The results cannot verify 
the hypothesis that the market reaction is more favorable for financial services partner 
firms that form joint ventures with partners following alliances.
The results are different for mergers and acquisitions. The mean abnormal return 
for partners of alliances followed by mergers and acquisitions is 1.82%, while for others
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it is only 0.36%, the difference is significant at the 10% level. The results support the 
hypothesis that the market reaction is more favorable for financial services partner firms 
that merge with partners after the alliances. Furthermore, the favorable market reaction is 
concentrated among target firms. The target firms have a 4.43% mean abnormal return 
and 2.24% median abnormal return, higher than those of the acquirer firms, significant at 
the 5% and 10% level, respectively. The results suggest that the market is able to identify 
those partner firms of alliances that are more likely to be followed by mergers and 
acquisitions.
In order to find out what types of alliances are more likely to be followed by joint 
ventures or mergers and acquisitions, I further examine the percentages of alliances 
followed by joint ventures or mergers and acquisitions across different types of alliances. 
Table 4.10 reports the distributions of strategic alliances followed by joint ventures or 
mergers and acquisitions. When alliances involve banks, insurance services firms, or 
investment services firms, the percentages of alliances followed by joint ventures or 
mergers and acquisitions are 3.79%, 4.44%, and 5.62%, respectively. I find no significant 
differences in the percentages of follow-up joint ventures or mergers and acquisitions 
between cross-industry alliances and within-industry alliances, alliances with cross- 
border activities and alliances with within-border activities, as well as international 
alliances and domestic alliances.
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Table 4.10
Distributions of strategic alliances followed by joint ventures or mergers and acquisitions.
Num ber o f  
strategic 
alliances
Num ber o f  




Percentage o f  
fo llow ing joint 
ventures or 
m erges and 
acquisitions
Banks (6000  through 6199) 317 12 3.79
Insurance services (6300  through 6411) 135 6 4.44
Investm ent services (6200  through 6299 and 6700  
through 6799)
409 23 5.62
Cross-industry strategic alliances 219 18 8.22




A lliances w ith cross-border activities 54 2 3.70
A lliances w ith within-border activities 
D ifference, p - \a lu e
741 35 4.72
0.704
International strategic alliances 239 11 4 .60




Equity alliances 25 7 28.00




Strategic alliances w ith prior relationships betw een  
partners
51 6 11.76
Strategic alliances w ithout prior relationships betw een  
partners 
D ifference, p-value
744 31 4 .17
0.097*
Total 795 37 4 .65
The sample includes 795 strategic alliances b y  financial services firms announced during 1986 to 2003. I 
search the SD C  M ergers and A cquisitions database and L exis/N exis to find w hich strategic alliance firms 
formed join t ventures or m erged w ith alliance partners after the alliance. Cross-industry alliances involve at 
least one firm from  other than the financial services industry. W ithin-industry alliances involve firms on ly  
from  the financial services industry. A lliances w ith cross-border activities are alliances where activities 
occu r in  m ore than o n e  country. A llia n ce s  w ith  w ith in-h ord er ac tiv ities  are alliances where activities occur 
in  one country. International alliances involve firms from  different countries. D om estic alliances involve  
firms from  on ly  one country. Equity alliances are alliances w here at least one partner firm buys equity in  
another partner firm. I search for evidence o f  relationships betw een partners o f  alliances before the 
alliances in  the SD C  M ergers and A cquisitions database as w ell as L exis/N exis. To test the differences in  
percentages o f  jo in t ventures or mergers and acquisitions betw een  the subsam ples, I calculate z-statistics 
and report the corresponding -values.
***, **, and * S ignificance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (2-tail tests).
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I find that the percentage of equity alliances followed by joint ventures or mergers 
and acquisitions is 28%, while for other alliances it is only 3.90%; the difference is 
significant at the 1% level. The percentage of alliances with prior relationships between 
partners followed by joint ventures or mergers and acquisitions is 11.76%, while for other 
alliances it is only 4.17%; the difference is significant at the 10% level. The results show 
that equity alliances and alliances with prior relationships between partner firms are more 
likely to be followed by joint ventures or mergers and acquisitions.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, I present the empirical results of the analyses. Using the event- 
study methodology, I find that there is a positive overall market reaction to the strategic 
alliance announcements by financial services firms; that the market reaction is more 
favorable for financial services partner firms that participate in alliances with cross- 
border activities than alliances with within-border activities; that the market reaction is 
positive for financial services partner firms that are involved in financial services 
activities such as banking services or investment services in the alliances; and that the 
market reaction is more favorable for financial services partner firms that are involved in 
their own financial services activities in the alliances versus alliance firms that participate 
in other than their industry activities. The results also show that the market reaction is 
less favorable for financial services partner firms that are involved in alliances with 
financial services activities other than their own industry activities.
Using two methodologies to estimate the long-run abnormal stock performance 
for the participants of strategic alliances, I find that the results support only the 
hypothesis that long-run abnormal stock performance is positive after alliance
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announcements in the 1-year period, using the holding-period abnormal return 
methodology.
By examining the operating performance of the alliance firms, I find that the 
financial services partner firms experience worse operating performance than industry 
peers before and after strategic alliances. The results also show that the sample firms 
improve operating performance before strategic alliance announcements, while the 
performance deteriorates afterwards.
The results for joint ventures or mergers and acquisitions after the strategic 
alliances provide support for the hypothesis that the financial services partner firms are 
more likely to form joint ventures or get into mergers and acquisitions with partners than 
other firms. Finally, the results of market reactions to strategic alliance announcements 
for alliances followed by joint ventures or mergers and acquisitions support the 
hypothesis that the market reaction is more favorable for financial services partner firms 
that merge with partners after the alliances.
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CONCLUSIONS
Due to deregulation of the financial services industry, technological advances, and 
globalization, the financial market has become more complex and diversified. Over the 
past 20 years, strategic alliances have become important means for accelerating growth 
for financial services firms. Strategic alliances can be very useful in raising entry barriers 
in the financial services industry and effectively reducing potential threats from future 
competition. Partner firms are thus able to maintain their competitive positions. Strategic 
alliances can be used as a strategic means for integrating or diversifying to expand the 
scale and/or scope of operations. The flexibility of the alliance option benefits the partner 
firms by allowing quick expansion and separation without their experiencing divesting 
problems and allows firms to try out different partners when developing new 
technologies or new marketing plans. By allying with others, firms extend their resource 
bases instead of relying solely on others. The partner firms also exchange and gain 
knowledge and ability in the process, lower their costs, achieve economies of scale in 
production, and use the resources pooled more efficiently. By entering strategic alliances 
with other participants in the market, firms provide signals of the quality of their 
resources and experience risk reduction and sharing. Furthermore, forming strategic
97
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alliances between acquirers and targets prior to mergers and acquisitions reduces 
information asymmetries through learning and solves adverse selection problems.
Given the increasing importance of strategic alliances in the financial services 
industry, but limited prior research, this study provides a more comprehensive and 
detailed investigation of the issue. My study contributes to the understanding of the 
wealth effects of strategic alliances on financial services firms and the level of 
cooperation between partner firms after strategic alliance announcements. By providing 
insight into strategic alliances, this study may help managers of financial services firms to 
participate more effectively in alliances, from the initial formation to the final outcome.
The sample period (1986-2003) covers an entire business cycle and the 
deregulation process in the financial services industry. Without including a wide range of 
industries in the sample, the results directly reflect the value creation by alliances in the 
financial services industry. The study contributes to the understanding of the wealth 
effects of strategic alliances on financial services firms by providing a comprehensive 
analysis of the market reaction to alliance announcements, pre- and post-announcement 
abnormal stock performance of the financial services partner firms, and pre- and post­
announcement operating performance of the partner firms. Furthermore, the study adds to 
the existing literature by examining the level of cooperation between strategic alliance 
partner firms after alliance announcements, such as joint ventures or mergers and 
acquisitions.
I examine a sample of financial services firms that were involved in strategic 
alliances during 1986 to 2003. I find that strategic alliance announcements have a 
positive effect on the wealth creation of financial services firms. The results show that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
announcements of strategic alliances increase the value of partner firms by 0.53%, which 
provides support for financial services firms to maintain active participation in strategic 
alliances or to enter into strategic alliances in the future. I find no consistent evidence of 
abnormal long-term stock performance before or after alliance announcements. Therefore, 
the positive wealth effect of strategic alliances seems to be fully captured by the market 
reaction to alliance announcements. Alliance firms improve their operating performance 
before alliance announcements. After alliance announcements, operating performance 
deteriorates; however, this deterioration is driven by the deterioration in industry 
performance.
Some alliance partners extend their cooperation after alliance announcements. 
Consistent with the hypothesis that firms use strategic alliances to reduce information 
asymmetries between alliance partners before getting involved in more committed 
partnerships, I find that strategic alliance firms are more likely to form joint ventures or 
merge than randomly selected or matched firms. However, joint ventures and mergers 
and acquisitions are not common after strategic alliances are formed; only about 5% of 
alliances are followed by joint ventures or mergers of partner firms. This finding suggests 
that firms often form alliances without expecting this cooperation to become more 
involved through joint ventures or mergers. Reasons other than preparation for joint 
ventures or mergers are more common for strategic alliances of financial services firms. I 
also find that the market reacts more favorably to alliance announcements by firms that 
are subsequently acquired by the alliance partners. The market seems to be able to predict 
at the time of the alliance announcement which firms have the potential for extending 
their cooperation. The results also show that equity alliances and alliances with prior
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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relationships between partners are more likely to be followed by joint ventures or 
mergers and acquisitions.
In this study, I provide a comprehensive analysis on evaluating the wealth effects 
of strategic alliances for financial services firms and the level of cooperation between 
partner firms after strategic alliance announcements. Similar methodologies can be 
employed to analyze strategic alliances in other industries, which might provide insights 
into alliance activities for other industry participants.
I also find that financial services alliance partners experience an improvement in 
operating performance before alliance announcements and a deterioration afterwards. The 
deterioration in operating performance after alliance announcements appears to be driven 
by deterioration in industry performance. It is possible that the alliance firms anticipate a 
downturn in the industry, and use alliances as a defensive strategy. Further research 
should be conducted to explore the reasons behind this pattern of improvement and 
deterioration in operating performance of strategic alliance firms, such as under­
performing firms more actively participating in alliances and engaging in earnings 
management before forming alliances in order to attract better potential alliance partners.
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